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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON TAX AVOIDANCE, MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
GIULIA ZILIO
AUGUST 2017

Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace.
Major Department: Economics.
This dissertation consists of three distinct essays on tax avoidance, monetary policy and
international trade.
The first chapter focuses on profit shifting. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate
the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to shift profits to
countries with more favorable tax treatments. I improve upon the current practice to estimating
this elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency with which countries enforce their
anti-tax avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to enforce them. I report evidence
showing that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance rules and the
incentive to enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semi-elasticity of
reported profits with respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical model. I
estimate the empirical model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than 40,000
affiliates located in 28 countries during the period from 2008 to 2014.
The second chapter I conduct an event study to first examine the role of macroeconomic
news surprises on monetary policy expectations; second, I estimate the effect that changes in
short and long-term monetary policy expectations have on financial markets on days of
macroeconomic news announcements compared to days of federal open market committee
(FOMC) announcements. Factor analysis is used to build a short and a long-term measure of

monetary policy expectations using federal funds futures and Eurodollar futures. I
conclude that the path and the target factors are both affected by several macroeconomic news
surprises.
Finally in the last chapter I use a stochastic general equilibrium, two-country model of
trade and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to assess the effect of
two exogenous shocks: a negative technology shock to China’s productivity and a trade policy
shock that makes exporting to China less costly and importing from China more expensive
(known as the border-adjustment tax). I find that a negative productivity shock in China results
in a reduction of imports from China and an increase in the entry of firms in the United States. At
the contrary, a trade policy shock in the United States leaves American (Chinese) consumers
slightly worst (better) off.
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Introduction
My dissertation is divided in three different chapters: “Cross-Country Differences in
Corporate Tax Rates, Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules, and Base Erosion Profit Shifting”, “Does
Macroeconomic News Affect Monetary Policy Expectations and Asset Prices? Evidence from
Event Studies” and “The Impact of China’s Economic Slowdown and United States’ New Trade
Policy on both the United States and China”.
In the first chapter I look at how Cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT)
rates create incentives for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to manipulate the prices that they
use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to shift profits to countries with
more favorable tax treatments. Such behavior reduces the aggregate tax burden of an MNE thus
increasing its worldwide after-tax profits, which presumably increases stockholder value.
However, this behavior also erodes the CIT bases of countries, like the United States and other
OECD countries, with relatively high CIT rates. To mitigate such behavior, governments adopt
and enforce anti-tax avoidance rules. In this paper, I seek to gauge the effect on profit shifting of
CIT-rate differentials among countries. I improve upon the current practice to estimating this
elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency with which countries enforce their anti-tax
avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to enforce them. I report evidence showing
that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance rules and the incentive to
enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits with
respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical model. I estimate the empirical
model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than 40,000 affiliates located in 28
countries during the period from 2008 to 2014. To illustrate the practical consequences for tax
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policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical model, I conduct a policy simulation in
which the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent.
The second chaper focuses on monetary polices and central bank annuncements. Interest
rates have played a crucial role in the latest global financial crisis. Financial investors closely
follow macroeconomic news announcements in order to predict central banks’ monetary policies,
which indirectly affect interest rates. In this paper, I first examine the role of macroeconomic
news surprises (specifically those related to the labor market, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer
confidence, retail sales and new home sales) on monetary policy expectations; second, I estimate
the effect that changes in short and long-term monetary policy expectations have on financial
markets on days of macroeconomic news announcements compared to days of federal open
market committee (FOMC) announcements. Factor analysis is used to build a short- (target
factor) and a long-term (path factor) measure of monetary policy expectations using federal
funds futures and Eurodollar futures. Finally, after performing several event studies using United
States financial data from 1998 to 2014, I conclude that the path and the target factors are both
affected by several macroeconomic news surprises; investor’s expectations of monetary policies
are also impacted by positive and negative macroeconomic news announcements; financial
markets’ reactions to monetary policy expectations are larger in absolute value on days of
numerous macroeconomic indicators announcements compared to days of FOMC
announcements. Focusing on the latest financial crisis, I report evidence that investor’s shortterm monetary policy expectations are not affected by unexpected changes in macroeconomic
indicators.
The last and third chapter looks at numerous international trade dynamics between China
and the United States. In recent years, large emerging markets have accounted for the majority of
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the growth of global demand. China is the largest of these fast growing emerging economies and
the second largest economy in the world. For nearly two decades, China has been on the list of
top ten U.S. trading partners. It is by far the United States' largest source of imported goods as
well as an increasingly important destination for U.S.-made products. Therefore, it is not
surprising that financial markets and policy makers in the United States closely follow news
related to China. In this paper, I use a stochastic general equilibrium, two-country model of trade
and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to assess the effect of two
exogenous shocks. First, a negative technology shock to China’s productivity and second, a trade
policy shock that makes exporting to China less costly and importing from China more
expensive (known as the border-adjustment tax). In this model, an exogenous shock to aggregate
productivity or to trade costs induces firms to enter and exit, thus altering the composition of
businesses. This in turn effects wages and the price and type of goods available to consumers in
each country. I find that a negative productivity shock in China results in a reduction of imports
from China and an increase in the entry of firms in the United States. While the labor market in
the United States benefits from this shock via an increase in wages, American consumers lose
due to their being less variation in the type of goods available and the increase in prices. At the
contrary, a trade policy shock in the United States (specifically, a tariff on imports and a subsidy
on exports) leaves American (Chinese) consumers slightly worst (better) off. This latter policy
also results in an increase (decrease) in the total number of firms in the United States (China).
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Chapter I: Cross-Country Differences in Corporate Tax Rates, Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules,
and Base Erosion Profit Shifting
1. Introduction
Policy-makers and the public alike are paying increasing attention to issues involving
international taxation because, among other reasons, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are using
increasingly sophisticated tax planning strategies to minimize their worldwide tax liabilities. For
example, cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for
MNEs to manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer
prices) to shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Doing so, without
detection by the tax authorities, decreases the MNE’s aggregate CIT liabilities and increases its
worldwide after-tax profits which, presumably, increases shareholder value. However, such
behavior by MNEs erodes the tax bases of countries, like the United States and other OECD
countries, with relatively high CIT rates. Clausing (2015) estimates that the United States lost
$111 billion in federal CIT revenue in 2012 due to the illegal shifting by U.S.-based MNEs of
$371 billion of corporate profits to foreign affiliates.
Generally speaking, a country has two policy options at its disposal to deter so-called
base erosion profit shifting (BEPS) by MNEs. They can cut the CIT rate and/or adopt and
enforce anti-tax avoidance regulations. Cutting the CIT rate to deter BEPS can be likened to
international tax competition to attract mobile capital. The he risk of countries cutting CIT rates
is that it will lead to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ where governments repeatedly cut CIT rates in
response to the tax cuts of other countries in a repeated game of ‘tit-for-tat’.
The existing literature on BEPS (Hines Jr & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008;
Lohse & Riedel, 2013), henceforth HR, HL, and LR, respectively, generally focuses on
estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT tax-rate differentials among
4

countries (henceforth referred to simply as the semi-elasticity of reported profits).1 At this point,
the alert reader may very well be puzzled. How does the semi-elasticity of reported profits allow
tax policy analyst to conclude anything about the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries
on BEPS? The relationship between reported profits and BEPS is relatively straightforward. In
contrast to reported profits, which is observable, the true profits and the amount of tax motivated
profit shifting by an MNE’s affiliate is not observable. However, the reported profit of an MNE’s
affiliate is equal to its true profit minus the net amount of outbound profit shifting, which may be
positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, minus the cost to the
affiliate of engaging in intracompany transactions to shift profits to a foreign affiliate. In other
words, the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate is a negative function of the net amount of
outbound profit shifting in response to cross-country differences in CIT rates. This relationship
allows us to infer the effect of CIT-rate differentials on BEPS from the semi-elasticity of
reported profits. This explains why the literature has settled upon this approach.
In this paper, I show that the current ‘state-of-the-art’- empirical models of reported
profits not only result in biased estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, but are also
misspecified. First, existing studies fail to account for the stringency with which countries
enforce their transfer-pricing rules. Yet, countries with relatively high CIT rates are more likely
to adopt and more stringently enforce transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS. Therefore,
empirical models of reported profits which do not control for the stringency with which countries
enforce their anti-tax avoidance rules may result in inconsistent estimates of the semi-elasticity
1

I estimate a semi-log specification of a model of reported profits. A semi-elasticity gives the percentage change in
the dependent variable in terms of a change of the dependent variable. Algebraically, the semi-elasticity S of a
function f at point x is. More specifically, the dependent variable in a semi-log specification of the model is the
natural logarithm of an affiliate’s reported profits and, on the right-hand-side of the regression equation, is the
simple difference in the maximum statutory CIT rate of the host country of the affiliate and that of the host country
of the MNE’s ultimate owner. As a result, the estimated coefficient of the CIT-rate differential is a semi-elasticity
rather than an elasticity which is the interpretation given to the estimated coefficient in a double-log specification
(Olsen & Osmundsen, 2003).
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of reported profits due to omitted variable bias. To be fair, existing approaches to estimating the
semi-elasticity of reported profits do include controls for the adoption of anti-tax avoidance
regulations, particularly transfer-pricing rules, by countries over time. However, adopting
transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to mitigate BEPS. A country must also
enforce its rules and apply penalties for detected violations by domestic affiliates of MNEs to
deter BEPS.
The second reason that existing practice may result in biased estimates of the semielasticity of reported profits is that the CIT-rate differential is potentially endogenous because of
international tax competition among countries aimed at stemming BEPS. Again, there are a few
studies that use instrumental variables to estimate their models of reported profits (Hines Jr &
Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008); however, the overwhelming majority of studies do not
appear to address this issue in the estimation of their models of reported profits.
Third, and certainly most seriously, researchers have not accounted for the incentives of
countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules in the specification of their empirical models of
reported profits. More specifically, a country seeking to mitigate BEPS should only monitor the
transfer-pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaged in intracompany transactions
involving foreign affiliates located in countries with lower CIT rates than its own. Since a
country’s tax administration must use scarce resources to enforce transfer-pricing rules, countries
should not monitor the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in
intracompany transactions involving the foreign affiliates located in countries with higher CIT
rates than its own. In this case, the domestic affiliate has no incentive to shift profits to the
foreign affiliate; to do so would increase the aggregate tax burden of the MNE. More
specifically, countries with high CIT rates should use scarce administrative resources to monitor
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the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany
transactions with foreign affiliates located in low CIT-rate countries. And, researchers striving to
provide consistent estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits should take these incentives
into account when specifying and estimating an empirical model of reported profits.
To address these three concerns, I construct a dummy variable for the stringency with
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules. The enforcement dummy variable reflects
both the level of transfer-pricing documentation that a country requires domestic affiliates of
MNEs to submit with its annual CIT return, and the frequency with which the host country
applies penalties for violations of its transfer-pricing rules. In constructing the enforcement
dummy variable for a given country, the specification of the model accounts for whether the
incentives facing the domestic affiliate of the MNE and thus whether the host country should
monitor the affiliate’s transfer-pricing practices. As discussed in greater detail below, I show that
the functional form of the empirical model must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the
estimation of potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits.
In this paper, I develop a theoretical model of tax motivated profit shifting which also
accounts for the incentives of countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules. The comparative
statics of the model show that there are potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported
profits with respect to CIT-rate differentials among countries. Based on this finding, I specify an
empirical model of reported profits, which is sufficiently flexible to permit the simultaneous
estimation of these three semi-elasticities of reported profits. Specifically, I estimate a semielasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit shifting
because the host country of the MNE’s subsidiary (ultimate owner) has a greater CIT-rate than
the host-country of the MNE’s ultimate owner (subsidiary). This accounts for two of the three
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semi-elasticities of reported profits. I estimate a third semi-elasticity of reported profits for the
case in which neither country has adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them.
Following the existing literature, I estimate my model of reported profits using detailed
firm-level data for the period 2008 to 2014. In contrast to the sample periods used in previous
studies, my sample period spans the Great Recession.2 The sample, which is constructed from
the Orbis database, contains information on 43,103 affiliates located in 28 countries. Since the
sample includes affiliates with ultimate owners located in a variety of developing, developed,
and tax haven countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the combinations of CIT-rate
differentials and transfer-pricing enforcement regimes in my sample. This variation should be
helpful in identifying the parameter estimates of the model. Using this sample, I estimate a firmlevel, instrumental variables, fixed-effects, panel-data model of reported profits to gauge the
effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate.
My preferred estimate, when countries enforce their transfer-pricing rules, is -3.2 (-1.0)
for the semi-elasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -3.2 implies that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate
differential results in a 32 percent decrease in an affiliates’ reported profits due to outbound
profit shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -1.0 implies that a 10 percent decrease in the
CIT-rate differential results in a 10 percent increase in an affiliates’ reported profits due to
inbound profit shifting. My preferred estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profit when
neither country has adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them is equal to -3.5,
meaning that a ten percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in
the affiliates’ reported profits.

2

Orbis is Bureau van Dijk's flagship database of private and listed company information from around the world that
emphases the ownership linkages among firms that belong to the same multinational enterprise.
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Finally, to illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly
specifying the empirical model of reported profits, I conduct a policy simulation. I assume the
United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percentage points, which results in a proposed-law CIT
rate of 15 percent. This is approximately equal to the median CIT rate of OECD countries. I use
my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as a single estimate of
the semi-elasticity obtained using a state-of-the-art but seriously misspecified model to conduct
the policy simulation. This exercise shows that using consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities
obtained from a correctly specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated CIT tax
revenue effect of the proposed reform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief
overview of the literature on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits. In particular, I
focus on those studies that control for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules by countries over
time. Section 3 describes a simple theoretical model of tax motived profit shifting by MNEs and
analyzes the comparative statics of the model. Section 4 describes the data and construction of
the sample used to estimate the empirical model, the econometric specification of the model of
profit shifting, and the construction of the variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. I
report the results of the policy simulation in the subsequent section, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
It is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive review of the vast
literature on BEPS.3 Therefore, we proceed below by reviewing some of the seminal and most
relevant papers in this literature.

3

See Heckemeyer & Overessh (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) for up-to-date and excellent reviews of the literature
on BEPS.
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The literature on tax-motivated, international profit shifting focuses on gauging the effect
of CIT-rate differentials on the reported profit of the affiliates of MNEs. Due to the large variety
of methodologies, data, and sample periods used in this literature, it is difficult to compare
estimates. Heckemeyer & Overesh (2013), however, seek to provide a consensus estimate of the
semi-elasticity of reported profits by conducting a meta-analysis of the available estimates in the
literature while controlling for the diversity of approaches. They report a consensus estimate of
-0.8, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate differential among countries causes an 8
percent decrease in the reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate.
The literature on BEPS generally follows the practice introduced by HR. They assume
that the true profit of an MNE’s affiliate is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function,
multiply by normalized prices, and subtracting production costs. They further assume that it is a
function of capital, labor, and technological change. They use the natural logarithm of these
variables as regressors in their empirical model to control for the true profits earned by the
MNE’s affiliate in a given country. Using aggregate time-series data, HR and Gruber & Mutti
(1991) report evidence of a decrease in the reported profits of subsidiaries located in countries
with high CIT rates. In addition to not accounting for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance
rules, they do not account for the role of CIT rates in other countries in which an MNE has a
presence.
To address the latter issue, HL estimate a model of reported profits using a 1999 crosssection of firm-level data for 12 European countries. They use the weighted-average (by the size
of the affiliate) CIT rates of countries in which an MNE has a presence to calculate the CIT-rate
differential facing an MNE’s affiliate. They report an estimated semi-elasticity of reported
profits with respect to the weighted-average, CIT-rate differential of -1.3. (Dischinger, Knoll, &
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Riedel, 2014; Lohse & Riedel, 2013) also report evidence consistent with BEPS by MNEs. They
show that reported profits are greater (less) than predicted for affiliates located in countries with
relatively low (high) CIT rates.
To their credit, Dharmapala & Riedel (2013) and LR make an important methodological
contribution to specification of models of reported profit by including a control variable for the
existence of transfer-pricing rules by country and over time. As previously discussed, however,
the mere existence of transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to deter BEPS.
Countries must also enforce their anti-tax avoidance regulations if they are going to have a
deterrent effect on the tax planning strategies of MNEs. Since I contend that the stringency with
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules plays an important role in correctly specifying
a model of reported profits and consistently estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits, I
proceed below by carefully describing the approaches used in the literature to control for
transfer-pricing rules by country and over time.
Although Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) do not focus on the effect of transfer-pricing
rules on BEPS, they do introduce a control variable for transfer-pricing rules as a robustness
check of their estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. They do so by constructing an
index of transfer-pricing rules for each country in their sample based on the following three
criteria: (1) a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules; (2) the country requires domestic
affiliates of MNEs to provide transfer-pricing documentation with its annual CIT return; and (3)
the country’s adoption of penalties for violating transfer-pricing rules. They estimate their model
of reported profits using a sample of 16 countries. As expected, they report evidence that the
responsiveness of reported value added to CIT-rate differentials among countries is stronger for
observations in countries with less stringent rules than it is for observations located in countries
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with more stringent rules. The potential limitations of this approach are twofold. First, their
estimate may not be identified because of the limited number of countries in their sample which
may result in a lack of sufficient variation in the index of transfer-pricing rules. Second, and
more importantly, their control variable for the existence of transfer-pricing rules does not
account for whether countries are actually assessing penalties on domestic affiliates of MNEs for
violations of their transfer-pricing rules.
Lohrse & Riedel (2012, 2013) also include an index for transfer-pricing rules based on a
country’s documentation requirements. In their specification of the econometric model, they
include an interaction term between the index for the existence of transfer-pricing rules and the
CIT-rate differential among countries. This allows the estimate of semi-elasticity of reported
profits to differ for affiliates of MNEs located in countries with documentation requirements and
for those located in countries without such requirements. They conclude that transfer-pricing
regulations are an important strategy for governments seeking to deter BEPS. However, they also
do not account for whether countries actually enforce for their transfer-pricing rules.
Klessen & Laplante (2012) look deeply into the interaction between the regulatory costs
to an MNE’s affiliate of the “enforcement” of transfer-pricing rules and a proxy variable for
income shifting. They estimate their model using a sample of MNEs located in the United States.
Their measure of enforcement is the IRS audit rate for large corporations. This is arguably an
imprecise measure of the enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. As a proxy for regulatory costs,
they use the weighted average of the existence and enforcement of transfer-pricing rules among
the major trading partners of the United States. They conclude that U.S. companies are becoming
more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have
changed over time.
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Beer & Loeprick (2013) study the effect of the introduction of transfer-pricing rules on
the time path of reported profits. They find that within four years of introducing a rule requiring
transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with an MNE’s annual CIT return, the reported
profits of a subsidiary decreases by approximately 60 percent. Theirs is an innovative way of
thinking about the regulator costs of transfer-pricing rules. At the risk of being repetitive, their
econometric specification does not include a control variable for whether a country actually
enforces its documentation requirements.
The present research makes the following contributions to the literature on BEPS. First,
my econometric specification includes a control variable that accounts for the enforcement of
transfer-pricing rules. This variable was painfully constructed using information gleaned from
reviewing hundreds of reports issued by KPMG and Ernst & Young. Second, in constructing the
enforcement dummy variable, I account for the incentives of the host country to enforce its
transfer-pricing rules vis-à-vis a foreign affiliate of the MNE based on the prevailing CIT-rate
differential between those the host countries. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable, I
use the rules of the ultimate owner’s host country when that country’s top statutory CIT rate is
greater than that of the foreign subsidiary’s host country and, vice versa, I use the rules of the
foreign subsidiary’s host country when that country has a top statutory CIT rate that is greater
than that of the ultimate owner’s host country. The rationale for constructing the enforcement
dummy variable in this manner is straightforward: countries should only monitor the transferpricing practices when a domestic affiliate of an MNE is engaging in intracompany transactions
with a foreign affiliate located in a country with a lower CIT rate than its own. When a domestic
affiliate’s host country has a lower CIT rate than that for the foreign affiliate’s host country,
there is simply no risk of BEPS.
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Third, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the theory, the specification of my
empirical model is sufficiently flexible to allow for the simultaneous estimation of three separate
semi-elasticities of reported profit. Fourth, the sample used to estimate the model includes a
larger number of countries, including developing, developed, and tax haven countries, than those
used in previous studies. Consequently, there is likely to be greater heterogeneity in the sample
in terms of the combinations of CIT-rate differentials among countries and the values of the
enforcement dummy variable used in this study. The added variation among the independent
variables should be helpful in identifying estimated parameters of the model. Fifth, I estimate an
instrument variables model to address the potential endogeneity of the CIT-rate differentials
among countries in my sample.
3. A simple model of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE
In this section, we describe a simple model of tax-motivated, international profit shifting of an
MNE and derive the comparative statics of the model. The comparative static results of the
model are useful in guiding the specification of the empirical model and also provide an entirely
new set of testable hypotheses that are an important focus of the econometric exercise discussed
in the subsequent section of this study.
3.1. Theoretical model
A fundamental concept in this section is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate, which
is defined as follows:

Where

π =π −S −

γ S

π

(1)

is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate j (= 1,…, n) located in country J (= 1,…,

n); tJ is the CIT rate of country J;

is the true profit earned by the MNE in country J; Sj is the
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net amount of outbound profit shifting by the MNE’s affiliate j; and

𝐽

⁄

is the total cost to

affiliate j of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a foreign affiliate.
These costs are assumed to be increasing in the stringency with which country J enforces its antitax avoidance rules, which is denoted by J. This policy parameter is assumed to be greater than
or equal to zero. As discussed in greater detail below, I assume that

J

= 0, when country J has no

incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing rules (because it is receiving revenue from the foreign
affiliate). In addition, the total costs of engaging in illegal profit shifting to a foreign affiliate is a
positive function of the ratio of the square of the net amount of outbound profit shifting and the
true profit of the MNE’s affiliate j. The quadratic specification of the cost function captures the
assumption that the costs to the affiliate increase with the square of the net amount of illegal
outbound profit shifting.
Following HR and HL, we assume that an MNE seeks to maximize worldwide after-tax
profits subject to the constraint that the sum of net outbound profit-shifting by all n affiliates of
the MNE is equal to zero. Furthermore, I assume an affiliate’s net outbound profit shifting may
be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE in particular countries.
The resulting constrained optimization problem can be written as follows:
max V = ∑( − 𝐽 )π = ∑( − t ) π − S −
=

=

subject to ∑

=

= .

γ S

π

,

To simplify the model, we assume that the MNE only has two affiliates: a foreign
affiliate g located in country G, and an affiliate h located in the MNE’s home country H. The
Lagrange expression for (2) is given by the following expression:
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(2)

L=

−t
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−

𝑔

−

)+

−t

(

ℎ

−

ℎ

−

ℎ

ℎ

) − 𝜆(

𝑔

+

ℎ ).

(3)

Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that the sum of Sj must equal zero; tJ is the
CIT rate of country J (= G, H);

is the true profit of affiliate j (= g or h) earned in country J (=

G or H, respectively); and Sj is the net amount of outbound profits being illegally shifted abroad
by affiliate j (= g or h).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the CIT rate of country G is greater than that
of country H or tG – tH > 0. Given the tax incentives created by (tG – tH) > 0, the MNE should
seek to shift profits from the foreign affiliate g to the home affiliate h. This action by the MNE
will increase country H’s CIT base and consequently its CIT revenues. Given these
circumstances, country H has no incentive to spend scarce administrative resources monitoring
the transfer pricing practices of a domestic affiliate in so far as it is engaging in intracompany
transactions with the foreign affiliate g. There is simply no risk that the domestic affiliate h will
seek to shift profits to the foreign affiliate by strategically using transfer prices to understate the
true profit earned in country H. If, however, affiliate g is engaging in intracompany transactions
with affiliate h, country G should monitor affiliate g’s transfer-pricing practices to deter BEPS.
Therefore, we assume

> 0 and

= 0.

The necessary first order conditions for a maximum are given as follows:
𝐿

𝑖

=−

−t ( +

𝑖

𝜋𝑖𝑇

) = 𝜆.

(4)

Where i = g or h, and I = G or H. Solving these two equations simultaneously for affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting results in the following expression:
∗
𝑔

=

−
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(

𝑇
𝜋𝑔

−

)

(5)

The signs of the expressions on the right-hand-side of (5) implies that

∗
𝑔

> 0, meaning that

affiliate g should shift profits to affiliate h. This in turn implies that affiliate g’s reported profits
will be less than the true profits earned in country G. Finally, the constraint Sg + Sh = 0 implies
that

∗
ℎ

=−

∗
𝑔

< 0, meaning that affiliate h is receiving inbound profit shifting, which, in turn,

implies its reported profits are greater than the true profits earned in country H. According to (5),
affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting is positively related to tG – tH, inversely
related to

G,

and independent of

H.

Differentiating (5) by the policy parameters available to country G to deter BEPS,
specifically tG – tH and

G,

results in the following two expressions:
∂ ∗g

∂ t −t

=

γ

πT
g

−t

>

∂Sg∗
πg t − t
=−
∂γ
γ
−t

and

(6)

< .

(7)

From (6), there is a positive relationship between the CIT-rate differential tG – tH and affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting, and (6) implies that there is a negative relationship
between the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules

G

and affiliate

g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting.
As previously discussed, the amount of illegal profit shifting among affiliates of an MNE
is not observable; therefore, (6) and (7) are difficult to test empirically. Since an affiliate’s
reported profits are observable, we recast the comparative static results derived above in terms of
the effect of G’s policy parameters on affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits. Substituting
(5) into (1) and differentiating the resulting expression by the policy parameters available to G to
mitigate BEPS, we obtain the following expressions:4

4

Substituting (5) into (1) results in the following expression for affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits:
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(8)

> , and

(9)

)> .

(10)

From (8), there is an inverse relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits
and the CIT-rate differential; (9) shows a positive relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level
of reported profits and the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules.
Finally, (10) implies that increasing the stringency with which country G enforces its transferpricing rules decreases (in absolute value) the effect of the CIT-rate differential on affiliate g’s
optimal level of reported profits. In other words, increasing the stringency with which a country
enforces its transfer-pricing rules deters BEPS for every positive value of the CIT-rate
differential between countries G and H.
A graph illustrating the implications of (8) - (10) for the relationships between affiliate
g’s optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential may help in understanding the
comparative static results of this model. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between affiliate g’s
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential. As we will see, the relationships
crucially depend on the stringency with which country G (H) enforces its transfer-pricing rules.

𝑔

∗

=

𝑔
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−
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−

−

−
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Figure 1: The Optimal Reported Profits of Affiliate g with Respect to the Corporate Income Tax
Rate Differential between Countries G and H

C

E
A

B
F
D
tG – tH

(0,0)

Note: The slope of the line segment labelled ̅̅̅̅ corresponds to in the econometric specification (10),
when
=
= . The slope of the line segment labelled ̅̅̅̅ is corresponds to + in the
econometric specification (10), when
> and
= . The slope of the line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅
corresponds to + in the econometric specification, when
= and
= .

The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents affiliate g’s reported profit

𝑔

∗

and the horizontal

axis represents the CIT-rate differential between countries G and H, which is denoted by (tG –
tH). The CIT-rate differential can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. When the CIT-rate
differential is equal to zero, there is no incentive for either affiliate to shift profits to the other;
therefore, affiliate g’s reported profits are equal to its true profits when tG = tH. This point is
labeled T on the vertical axis of Figure 1. Furthermore, if the reported profits of the affiliates are
independent of the CIT-rate differential, then affiliate g’s reported profits would always be equal
to its true profits. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that affiliate g’s true profit is exogeneous
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(i.e., independent of the CIT-rate differential), then affiliate g’s reported profit would equal its
true profit for every value of (tG – tH). This case is illustrated by the horizontal line and labeled
̅̅̅̅ and passing through point T. This line provides a useful reference in following discussion.

According to (8) – (10), we must analyze three distinct cases. First, let’s suppose neither

country adopts transfer-pricing rules in which case

G

=

H=

0. In this case, there is an inverse

relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and (tG – tH). This relationship
is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅ . When (tG – tH) < 0,

then affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g in which case affiliate g’s
reported profits are greater than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that that
the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅, which represents affiliate g’s reported profits, lies
above the line labelled ̅̅̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s true profits. The vertical distance

between ̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅ represents affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting, which is

equal to the amount of inbound profit shifting received by to affiliate g, for every value of (tG –
tH) < 0.
Now, let’s consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH > 0. In this situation,
affiliate g has an incentive to shift profits to firm h, or

∗
𝑔

> 0, and, as a result, the reported profits

of affiliate g are less than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that the
negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅ , representing affiliate g’s optimal level of reported

profits, lies below the horizontal line labelled ̅̅̅̅ , representing the true profits of affiliate g, for

every value of tG – tH > 0. The vertical distance between ̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅ represents affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting at every value of (tG – tH) > 0.

For purposes of interpreting the empirical model, it is important to observe that the
inverse relationship between affiliate g’s reported profits and its optimal level of net outbound
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profit shifting, which can be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the
MNE, is evident in Figure 1, as well. As we move from left to right along the horizontal axis, the
CIT-rate differential is increasing; reported profits are decreasing; and affiliate g’s optimal
amount of net outbound profit shifting is increasing. The negatively sloped line labeled ̅̅̅̅

illustrates (8) after setting

G=

0.

Turning to the second case 2, consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH < 0.
As previously discussed, affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g.
Now, in contrast to the previous case, country H enforces its transfer-pricing rules to prevent
BEPS. According to (10), enforcement decreases (in absolute value) outbound profit shifting by
affiliate h, and, consequently, we assume

H>

0. The effect of country H enforcing its transfer-

pricing rules on the optimal level of inbound profits being received by g with respect to the CITrate differential is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅̅. This
line segment is not as steeply sloped as the line labeled ̅̅̅̅ because country H is enforcing its

transfer-pricing rules. This has a deterrent effect on affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit
shifting thus decreasing the amount of inbound profits received by affiliate g at every value of tG
– tH < 0.
The third case arises when tG – tH > 0, and country G enforces its transfer pricing rules to
deter BEPS, thus

G>

0. Again, according to (10) enforcement decreases (in absolute value)

affiliate g’s optimal level of net outbound profit shifting at every value of tG – tH > 0. This is
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅ . Again, this line segment

is not as steeply sloped as the line segment ̅̅̅̅ because of the deterrent effect of country G

enforcing its transfer-pricing rules on affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting.

21

I conclude this section with a couple of final observations. First, the line segment labeled
̅̅̅̅ may not have a constant slope. Indeed, there should be a kink in ̅̅̅̅ at the point labelled T

on the vertical axis of Figure 1 if

G

≠

H,

meaning that one country is enforcing its transfer-

pricing rules, when it has the incentive to do so, more stringently than the other country.
Consequently, the functional form of the empirical model should be flexible enough to permit
the simultaneous estimation of three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profit. Second, for
expository reasons, I assume that true profits are exogenous. If, however, a country’s CIT rate
distorts the real activity of domestic affiliates of MNEs, as seems likely, then this could be
illustrated in Figure 1 by rotating the three lines counter-clockwise about the point labeled T on
the vertical axis. This also shows the necessity of controlling for true profits in the empirical
model.
In this section, we describe the data and the construction of the sample used to estimate
the empirical model, the econometric specification of the empirical model of reported profits,
and the variable construction.
3.2. The data and sample construction
To estimate the model, I use firm-level data. Such data are not readily available. At the
moment, there are only three government entities that collect information on MNEs: The Bureau
of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Operations and Management Companies Database in the U.S.,
Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on Direct Investments (MIDI), and the United
Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics annual inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI).
Unfortunately, these databases are not publicly available. Fortunately, some private institutions,
such as Capital IQ (COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ Platform) and Bureau Van Dijk-BvD (Orbis
and Amadeus), offer various platforms that contain information on company profits, costs,
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performance, and other indicators. These datasets are frequently used by firms providing
accounting services to MNEs and by tax enforcement authorities, such as the IRS to take one
example. These data are often used by scholars interested in corporate finance and international
tax issues and are frequently cited in the academic literature.
I construct a sample of affiliates of MNEs from the Orbis (BvD) database which contains
information on over 200 million private companies worldwide. One of the limitations of using
these data for the task at hand is that ownership information is only available for the most recent
year of the data. Indeed, when applying the match of the current year to prior years, it is possible
to obtain mismatches between parents and subsidiary firms, particularly when there have been
mergers and acquisitions during the intervening years. As noted in previous studies that use these
data (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Dischinger et al., 2014; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), this is an
unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of using these data. 5Since mergers and acquisitions are
relatively infrequent events (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), particularly during the time period
spanned by my sample, I believe that any bias resulting from using these data is relatively small.
I construct the sample, which I use to estimate the model, from the Orbis database by
excluding firms with the following characteristics: firms with subsidiaries, inactive firms, firms
with losses, non-industrial firms (banks, hedge funds, foundations, insurance, public authorities,
trustees, venture capital, and others), small firms as defined by Orbis and firms with an ultimate
owner located in the same country.6 Ultimate owners are excluded from the sample to prevent
perfect multicollinearity due to the adding-up constraint that profit-shifting must sum to zero.
Loss-making firms are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific accounting
rules; incorporating these rules into the empirical model is beyond the scope of the current study.
5

Fifty percent of the data available are lost due to these selection criteria.
Ultimate owners are excluded from the data set because the same semi-elasticity of BEPS is calculated using the
differential between an affiliate of an MNE and its ultimate owner.
6
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After applying these exclusion criteria to the dataset, the resulting sample consists of 48,309
subsidiaries for the period 2008 to 2014. Tables 1 and 2 report the number subsidiaries and
ultimate owners in the sample by country, respectively. I augment the firm-level data with
country-level data drawn from a variety of sources, as discussed in greater detail below.

Table 1: Number of affiliates in the sample by country
Country

Number of affiliates

1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Britain
5. Cyprus
6. Czech
7. Denmark
8. Estonia
9. Finland
10. France
11. Germany
12. Hong Kong
13. Iceland
14. Ireland
15. Italy
16. Japan
17. Luxembourg
18. Netherlands
19. New Zealand
20. Norway
21. Portugal
22. Slovakia
23. Slovenia
24. South Korea
25. Spain
26. Sweden
27. Switzerland
28. United States
Total number of affiliates
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5
895
2,959
4,386
39
3,108
1,194
631
886
6,161
3,584
5
14
743
4,044
156
40
779
725
1,273
1,858
1,892
546
995
3,838
2280
46
21
43,103

Table 2: Host countries of the ultimate owners (in alphabetical order)
Country
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Bermuda
Bosnia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Cayman Isl.
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany

Number
Country
of firms
10
9
13
490
1,300
30
3
2
2
1,058
198
5
60
31
450
196
18
319
14
2
47
287
291
1,281
1
3
18
777
2,957
1
6,107

Number
Country
of firms

Greece
Guinea-Bissau
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malaysia
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Panama

42
1
165
73
52
291
4
504
172
1,825
2,295
231
24
34
36
107
43
1626
1
58
104
17
21
50
22
8
1
1,992
63
811
67

Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Saint Vincent
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
UAE
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Total

Number
of firms
1
3
184
255
26
102
4
24
10
21
174
87
40
50
1,171
4
1,726
1,961
1
142
12
10
73
43
91
2,921
7,234
3
8
2
43,103

3.3. The econometric specification
To test the predictions derived from the theoretical model, I adapt the econometric
specification pioneered by HR and HL. More specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects,
instrumental variables, panel data model:
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of affiliate g’s reported profits in country
G and year t. The CIT-rate differential for countries G and H, respectively, in year t, is denoted
by tGt - tHt, and, as discussed in greater detail below,

and

are dummy variables reflecting

the stringency with which countries G and H, respectively, enforce their transfer-pricing rules
while also accounting for their incentives to do so. The interaction terms involving the CIT-rate
differential and the enforcement dummy variables provide the necessary flexibility to estimate
the three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits predicted by the theory.
The right-hand-side variables kgt and lgt, denote the value of firm g’s capital assets and
labor costs, respectively. The variable aGt denotes country G’s real GDP per capita, which serves
as a proxy variable for the rate of technological change. Following the methodology pioneered
by HR, these variables are included in the model to control for the true profit earned by affiliate
g in country G. The variable ωGt is a vector of country and time specific characteristics, namely
indexes of trade freedom and political stability; ϭst is an industry-year fixed effect; and ugt is a
stochastic-error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant
variance.
The model is estimated using an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous
variables in (10) involving the CIT-rate differential. Following HR and HL, I use the log
difference in the populations of the affiliates’ and ultimate owner’s host countries as an
instrument for the potentially endogenous variable. The intuition behind using this instrument is
that tax haven countries tend to be sparsely populated island countries, often located in the
Caribbean. In contrast, high CIT-rate countries tend to be more populous OECD countries. I
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conduct Hausman-Wu specification tests for each model. These tests reject the null hypothesis
that the variables involving the CIT-rate differential are exogeneous. I also conduct a WrightYogo test which rejects the null hypothesis that the log difference in populations is a weak
instrument. In short, I believe that the log difference in populations is a valid instrument. It is
sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous variables. Furthermore, there is no reason
to believe that it belongs in the model of reported profits; so the exclusion restriction is valid, as
well.
3.4. Construction of the variables
The dependent variable is measured by the natural logarithm of reported earnings before
interest and taxes (EBIT). Firm-level information on reported EBIT, the value of fixed assets,
and labor costs by year are from the Orbis database. The CIT-rate differential is constructed
using the maximum statutory CIT rates of an affiliate’s and ultimate owner’s host countries.
These data come from Bloomberg and various issues of Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guides, KPMG’s Global Corporate Tax Summaries, and Price-Waterhouse-Cooper’s Global
Corporate Tax Summaries.
The stringency with which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules is a dummy
variable which is built by the product of two constructed variables. One of the constructed
variables is a trichotomous variable reflecting the level of documentation that a country requires
a domestic affiliate of MNE to submit with its CIT return. The second constructed variable is
also a trichotomous variable reflecting the frequency with which a country applies penalties for
violating its transfer-pricing documentation requirements. Information used to construct these
variables comes from Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide and
KPMG’s Transfer Pricing Review by country and by year. Table 3 summarizes the criteria used
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to construct the categorical variables measuring the level of a country’s documentation
requirements and the frequency with which a country applies penalties for failing to comply with
its transfer-pricing documentation requirements.

Table 3: Coding of the categorical variables according to a country’s transfer-pricing
documentation requirements and application penalties for violations
Documentation requirements
Report

Information
provided in the
report

KPMG’s
Transfer Pricing
Review
Are transferpricing required
to be submitted
on an annual
basis?

Coding

Penalties applied for violations

EY’s Worldwide
KPMG’s
Transfer Pricing
Transfer Pricing
Reference Guide
Review
Documentation
To what extent
requirements and
are transfer
return disclosures
pricing penalties
and related-party
enforced?
disclosures
Answers to the questions stated above

EY’s Worldwide
Transfer Pricing
Reference Guide
Audit
risk/transfer
pricing scrutiny

0

No

No documentation
required.

Never

None

1

No, but
documents need
to be prepared
when requested

Documents are
required when a
firm is audited and
a firm has some
time to prepare
them.

Not often

Low risk

2

No, but
documents need
to prepared
along with the
tax return

Documents need to
be ready when
requested.

Increasing

Medium risk

Yes

Documents need to
be summited with
the annual CIT
return

Often or always

High risk

3

The product of these two constructed categorical variables results in a variable with the
following six values: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. For ease of reference, let’s refer to this variable as the
stringency measure. The enforcement dummy variable in (10) is constructed by setting it equal to
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one when the stringency measure is greater than or equal to four, and zero otherwise. To test the
robustness of the model, as discussed in greater detail below, I also estimate a specification in
which the enforcement variable is set equal to one when the stringency measure is greater than or
equal to five. This change in the definition of the enforcement dummy variable has no
appreciable effect on the estimated coefficients.
Data on GDP per capita and the index of trade freedom by country and year come from
the World Bank’s Development Indicators (World Bank Group) and the Heritage Foundation’s
Index of Economic Freedom, respectively. Table 4 reports sample summary statistics.

29

Table 4: Summary statistics for the full sample
Variable

Mean

Standard
Minimum Maximum
deviation

Source

CIT-rate differential (tG – tH)

-0.022

0.090

-0.425

0.407

Author

Average CIT-rate differential

0.009

0.041

-0.167

0.190

Author

Enforcement regime by the
subsidiary’s host country

0.259

0.438

0.000

1.000

Author

Enforcement by the ultimate
owner’s host country

0.656

0.475

0.000

1.000

Author

Transfer-pricing rules in the
subsidiary’s host country

0.991

0.091

0.000

1.000

Author

0.909

0.288

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

0.149

0.357

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

0.086

0.280

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

Log(subsidiary’s reported profits)

6.426

1.836

-11.236

15.614

ORBIS

Log(value of fixed assets)

6.559

2.626

-6.001

17.635

Author

Log(labor costs)

7.610

1.554

-4.977

16.486

Author

Log(GDP per capita)

10.521

0.386

9.592

11.667

ORBIS

Index of trade freedomc

68.442

15.544

38.500

96.000

ORBIS

Index of political stability

0.698

0.392

-0.466

1.514

Transfer-pricing rules in the
ultimate owner’s host country
Transfer-pricing documentation
required by the subsidiary’s host
country
Transfer-pricing documentation
required by the ultimate owner’s
host country

Note: the number of observations is 190,862.
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4. The empirical results
Now, we turn to the discussion of the empirical results. Since the focus of this research is
obtaining consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, I report estimates of this
parameter for a variety of specifications in Table 5. All specifications include a full set of firm
and industry-year fixed effects, and I report robust standard errors clustered at the MNE level.

Table 5: Instrumental variable estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits

Empirical specification

Semi-elasticity of reported profits
1+ 2
1+ 3
(country H has no
(country G has no
1
(without transferincentive to enforce incentive to enforce
its transfer-pricing
its transfer-pricing
pricing rules)
rules)
rules)
Models are estimated on the full sample

First-generation model

-1.789***

-

-

Second-generation model A

-1.589***

-1.039

-

Second-generation model B

-9.435*

-1.811***

-

Enforcement model 1

-3.54***

-3.063*

-1.286**

Model is estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH > 0
Enforcement model 2

-4.741*

-3.225*

-1.648

Models are estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH < 0
Enforcement model 3

-4.438*

-4.040

-1.041*

Note: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT). The second-generation model A includes a dummy variable = 1 if the subsidiary’s host country
requires transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with the affiliate’s annual CIT return and zero
otherwise. The second-generation model B includes a dummy variable = 1 if the for the subsidiary’s host
country has adopted transfer-pricing rules and zero otherwise. The enforcement model includes a dummy
variable = 1 if the host country of the subsidiary enforces transfer-pricing rules. The instrument for the
potentially endogenous variable (CIT-rate differential) is the log of the difference in populations of the two
countries.
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For the sake of comparison, I estimate a “first-generation model of reported profits,”
using my sample. This specification does not include a control variable for countries with
transfer pricing rules. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is reported in the
row labelled First-generation model and the second column of Table 5. The estimate is equal to 1.789 and it is distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. This
estimate has the expected sign. The full set of estimated coefficients for this specification are
reported in the second column of Table 6. For reasons previously discussed, I believe this model
is misspecificied and the estimate of the semi-elasticity is inconsistent.
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Table 6: Instrumental variable estimates of alternative models of reported profits
Empirical specification
Second
Second
generation A
generation B

Variable

First
generation

IT-rate differential
(tG – tH )

-1.798***
(0.633)

-1.589***
(0.512)

-9.435*
(5.002)

-3.540***
(1.244)

Transfer-pricing
documentation required by
subsidiary’s host country
(TPD-SHC)

-

0.050**
(0.023)

-

-

TPD-SHC×(tG – tH )

-

0.550
(0.352)

-

-

Existence of transferpricing rules in the
subsidiary’s country
(ETPR-SHC)

-

-

1.441*
(0.810)

-

ETPR-SHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

7.624*
(4.379)

-

Enforcement by
subsidiary’s host country
(E-SHC)

-

-

-

-0.026
(0.019)

E-SHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

-

0.477**
(0.189)

Enforcement by ultimate
owner’s host country (EUHC)

-

-

-

-0.081***
(0.019)

E-OHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

-

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.788***
(0.037)
0.012***
(0.002)

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.795***
(0.037)
0.012***
(0.002)

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.776***
(0.034)
0.012***
(0.002)

2.254**
(0.928)
0.045***
(0.003)
0.448***
(0.006)
0.804***
(0.034)
0.014***
(0.002)

190,862

190,862

190,862

190,862

R-squared

0.048

0.048

0.045

0.048

Number of subsidiaries

38,314

38,314

38,314

38,314

Log(value of fixed assets)
Log(labor costs)
Log(GDP per capita)
Index of trade freedom
Number of observations

Enforcement
model

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in
parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent
levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate33

level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1digit level).

Second-generation models include a variety of ways to control for whether a country has
transfer-pricing rules. Accordingly, I estimate two versions of the second-generation model,
using my sample. In version of the model that I refer to as the second-generation model A, I
follow the practice in the literature of controlling for whether a country has adopted transferpricing rules by including a dummy variable equal to one when the subsidiary’s host country
requires that the affiliates of MNEs submit documentation of their transfer-pricing practices.
This generation of models includes an interaction term between the CIT-rate differential and the
dummy variable controlling for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules. As a result, there are two
distinct estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. There is an estimate for the case in
which the host country does not have transfer pricing rules, and there is an estimate for the case
in which the host country of the subsidiary requires submission of documentation of the
affiliates’ transfer pricing practices. The former estimate is reported in the row labelled Secondgeneration model A and the second column of Table 5. This estimate is equal to -1.589.
Consistent with the theory, the estimate is negative and statistically different from zero at
conventional levels of significance. The latter estimate is equal to -1.039; however, it is not
distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. The estimated
coefficients for this specification are reported in the third column of Table 6.
In the specification that I refer to as the second-generation model B, I follow the practice
in the literature of controlling for a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules, which may or
may not include documentation of the affiliates’ transfer-pricing practices, by including a
dummy variable set equal to one when the host country of the subsidiary has adopted transfer-
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pricing rules of some type and zero otherwise. I also include an interaction term between the
CIT-rate differential and the dummy variable controlling for foreign subsidiary’s adoption of
transfer-pricing rules. The estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits are reported in the
row labelled second-generation model B of Table 5 and are equal to -9.435 and -1.811,
respectively. Consistent with the theory, the estimates are negative and statistically different
from zero at conventional levels of significance.
Second-generation models are an improvement over first-generation model because they
control for whether countries have adopted transfer-pricing rules. However, for these reasons
previously discussed, these models are misspecified and the estimated semi-elasticities are
inconsistent. These models do not account for which country – the host country of the subsidiary
or of the ultimate owner – has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces these rules, and has the
incentive to do so.
Now, I estimate (10) in which I include a dummy variable to control for whether a
country enforces its transfer-pricing rules and which country – the host of the affiliate or the
ultimate owner -- has an incentive to do so. In this specification of the model, there are two
interaction terms with the CIT-rate differential. There is an interaction term for the case in which
the host country of the affiliate (ultimate owner) has adopted transfer-pricing rules and has the
incentive to enforce them. Therefore, this specification results in three potentially distinct values
of the semi-elasticity of reported profits.7 The estimated coefficients of this specification are
reported in the fourth column of Table 6.
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These three semi-elasticities are defined in terms of (10) by the following expressions:

𝑅 )|
𝑑 [ (𝜋𝑔

𝑑

−

≥ ,

−

=

,= ]

=

;

𝑅 )|
𝑑 [ (𝜋𝑔

𝑑

−

≥ ,

−

= ,

= ]

=

+

; and

𝑅 )|
𝑑 [ (𝜋𝑔

𝑑

−

< ,

−

= ,

,= ]

where the subscripts G and H are for the host country of the affiliate and ultimate owner, resespectively.
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The estimated semi-elasticity for the case in which neither country enforces its transferpricing rules is reported in the row labeled Enforcement model 1 and the second column of Table
5. The estimated semi-elasticity is equal to -3.540 and is distinguishable from zero at
conventional levels of statistical significance. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the
CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in reported profits, which is substantial. The
estimate reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5 is for the case in which
the foreign affiliate’s host country has adopted, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so
because tG – tH > 0. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is equal to -3.063,
meaning that a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 30
percent decrease in reported profits. Consistent with the theory, this estimate is negative and
statistically distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level. Furthermore, it is somewhat
greater (in absolute value) than the previous estimate when countries do not enforce transferpricing rules. As reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5, the semielasticity of reported profits is equal to -1.286 and is statistically distinguishable from zero at the
5-percent level. This semi-elasticity corresponds to the case in which the ultimate owner’s host
country has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so
because tG – tH < 0. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential
results in an approximately 13 percent decrease in reported profits. As predicted by the theory,
this estimate is smaller (in absolute value) than the estimate when neither country enforces its
rules. It is also interesting to note that the estimates for the cases when the subsidiary’s and
ultimate owner’s host countries have the incentive to enforce their rules differ, as well.
Now, I estimate (10) on two subsamples to test the key assumption that accounting for
the incentive of a country to enforces its transfer-pricing rules is important for correctly
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specifying a model of reported profits. In the row labeled Enforcement 2, I report the estimates
of the semi-elasticities of reported profits on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is
positive or (tG – tH) > 0. In this case, the affiliate’s host country G has an incentive to enforce its
transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS, but the ultimate owner’s host country does not.
Consistent with the theory, the semi-elasticity for the case in which the host country of the
affiliate has the incentive to enforce its rules is negative and statistically distinguishable from
zero at the ten-percent level, but, as predicted by theory, the estimate when the ultimate owner’s
host country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so is indistinguishable from zero at
conventional levels of statistical significance. I repeat the same exercise on the subsample in
which the CIT-rate differential is negative or (tG – tH) < 0. In this case, the ultimate owner’s host
country has an incentive to enforce its rules but the foreign affiliate’s host country does not. The
estimated semi-elasticities for this subsample are reported in the row labelled Enforcement
model 2. Consistent with the theory, the semi-elasticity for the case in which the ultimate
owner’s host country has the incentive to enforce its rules, which is reported in column 3 of
Table 5, is negative and statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance.
And, as predicted by the theory, the estimate for the case in which the foreign affiliate’s host
country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so because (tG – tH) < 0 is indistinguishable
from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. These placebo estimates provide
important evidence that is consistent with the theory. In specifying a model of reported profits,
the functional form should be sufficiently flexible to permit the estimation of three semielasticities of reported profits. Furthermore, the construction of the enforcement dummy variable
should account for not only whether the country has adopted rules and enforces them but should
also account for whether the country has the incentive to enforce its rules given the tax incentives

37

facing domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany transactions with foreign affiliates.
The estimated coefficients obtained from these two subsamples are reported in columns 2 and 3,
respectively, of Table 7.

Table 7: Instrumental variable estimates of the enforcement model of reported profits
Sample
CIT-rate
differential
is positive
(tG – tH) > 0

CIT-rate
differential
is negative
(tG – tH) < 0

-3.540***
(1.244)

-4.741*
(1.172)

-4.438*
(1.809)

Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the
subsidiary’s host country (ETPR-SHC)

-0.001
(0.020)

-0.081***
(0.031)

0.008
(0.036)

ETPR-SHC×(tG – tH)

0.477**
(0.189)

1.516*
(0.900)

0.392
(0.336)

Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the ultimate
owner’s host country (ETPR-UHC)

-0.026
(0.019)

-0.161
(0.214)

0.092
(0.078)

ETPR-UHC×(tG – tH)

2.254**
(0.928)

3.093
(4.311)

3.397**
(1.600)

Log(value of fixed assets)

0.045***
(0.003)

0.042***
(0.005)

0.044***
(0.004)

Log(labor costs)

0.448***
(0.006)

0.433***
(0.010)

0.462***
(0.008)

Log(GDP per capita)

0.804***
(0.034)

0.733***
(0.065)

0.857***
(0.043)

Index of trade freedom

0.0138***
(0.002)

0.0171***
(0.003)

0.0120***
(0.003)

Number of observations

190,862

80,702

107,730

R-squared

0.048

0.041

0.053

Number of affiliates

38,314

17,137

22,475

Variable

Full

CIT-rate differential (tG – tH)

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in
parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent
levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliatelevel fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1digit level.
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To gauge the robustness of the main results to alternative specifications, estimate a
specification of the model in which I add a control variable for political stability. The estimated
coefficients of this specification are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 8. This model is estimated
on the full sample and the two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients have
the expected signs and statistical significance. Next, I examine the robustness of my main
findings to an alternative definition of the stringency with which a country enforces its rules.
More specifically, I redefine

Gt

and

Ht

to be equal to one when the constructed categorical

variable for the frequency of applying penalties is equal to or greater than six rather than four as
in the case of the previous specifications. The estimated coefficients of this specification are
reported in columns 4-6 of Table 8. Again, I estimate this specification on the full sample and the
two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients of this specification have the
expected signs and statistical significance.
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Table 8: Robustness of the main results to the inclusion of a political stability index and to an
alternative definition of enforcement
Includes an index of political stability
Variable
CIT-rate
differential
(tG – tH)
Enforcement by
subsidiary’s
host county (ESHC)
E-SHC×(tG –
tH)
Enforcement by
ultimate
owner’s host
county (EUHC)
E-UHC×(tG –
tH)
Log(value of
fixed assets)
Log(labor costs)
Log(GDP per
capita)
Index of trade
freedom
Political
stability index
Number of
observations
R-squared
Number of
affiliates

Sample

Alternative definition of
enforcement
Sample

Full

(tG – tH) > 0

(tG – tH) < 0

Full

(tG – tH) > 0

(tG – tH)
<0

-3.518***
(1.245)

-6.217*
(4.920)

-4.049**
(1.806)

-2.977***
(1.006)

-2.709
(5.297)

-2.980**
(1.260)

-0.0111
(0.0209)

-0.0921***
(0.0303)

-0.00869
(0.0363)

0.006
(0.023)

-0.043
(0.052)

0.007
(0.035)

0.393**
(0.192)

1.637*
(0.881)

0.266
(0.337)

0.661***
(0.233)

0.682*
(0.253)

0.464
(0.338)

-0.0236
(0.0188)

-0.219
(0.205)

0.0818
(0.0782)

0.044**
(0.018)

0.113
(0.168)

0.024
(0.064)

2.237**
(0.929)
0.045***
(0.00301)

4.290
(4.107)
0.042***
(0.00499)

3.087*
(1.596)

1.715**
(0.679)

1.853
(2.841)

0.044***
(0.004)

0.045***
(0.003)

0.044***
(0.005)

0.450***
(0.006)

0.433***
(0.010)

0.462***
(0.009)

0.448***
(0.006)

0.428***
(0.011)

0.447***
(0.00613)

0.433***
(0.00959)

0.844***
(0.0436)

0.794***
(0.035)

0.770***
(0.068)

0.013***
(0.002)

0.015***
(0.003)

0.0109***
(0.003)

0.015***
(0.002)

0.01
(0.003)

2.272*
(1.214)
0.044**
*
(0.004)
0.463**
*
(0.008)
0.849**
*
(0.044)
0.012**
*
(0.003)

0.0719***
(0.0195)

0.0779**
(0.0308)

0.0827***
(0.0263)

-

-

-

190,862

80,702

107,730

190,862

80,702

107,730

0.048

0.041

0.053

0.048

0.041

0.053

38,314

17,137

22,475

38,314

17,137

22,475

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT). The estimates of reported in right-hand-side panel of the table uses an alternative definition the
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dummy variable for a country’s enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. The dummy variable = 1.0 when the
constructed categorical variable is greater than or equal to 5 (rather than 4) and zero otherwise.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is
active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each
specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level).

5. Policy simulation
To illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the
empirical model of reported profits, I report describe the results of a policy simulation in this
section. For purposes of the simulation, I assume the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20
percent. A 20 percent cut in the top statutory CIT rate of the U.S. would be equivalent to a tax
rate of 15 percent, instead of the current-law rate of 35 percent. This proposal is particularly
relevant because the United States has one of the highest top statutory CIT rates in the world, and
there is an ongoing policy debate about the merits of the United States reducing its top statutory
CIT rate to make it more competitive with that of other countries.
For the sake of comparison, I use the estimated semi-elasticities for reported profits
obtained from the First–generation model reported and Enforcement model 1, which are reported
in the corresponding rows of Table 5, to provide two estimates of the policy simulation. The
estimates for the policy simulation based on the First-generation model of the effect of the
proposal on the percent change in reported CIT revenue by country and on the percent change in
aggregate reported firm EBIT by country are reported in columns two and three, respectively, of
Table 9, Similarly, the estimates for the policy simulation based on the Enforcement 1 model are
reported in columns four and five, of Table 9.8

8

The simulation for the first generation model I used column 1 if Table 6. 8 To run the simulation for the
enforcement model I used column 4 if Table 6
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Table 9: Policy simulation of the effect of the United States decreasing its CIT rate to 15 percent

Country

Based on the first-generation model
Percent change
in the sum of
Percent change
in tax revenue by
affiliate’s
reported profits
country
by country

Based on the enforcement model
Percent change
in the sum of
Percent change
in tax revenue by
affiliate’s
reported profits
country
by country

Austria

-4.48

-4.48

-2.53

-2.53

Belgium

-5.79

-5.79

-4.34

-4.34

Britain

-8.33

-8.33

-6.25

-6.25

Czech

-3.22

-3.22

-2.41

-2.41

Denmark

-5.40

-5.40

-2.67

-2.67

Estonia

-1.76

-1.76

-1.32

-1.32

Finland

-5.13

-5.13

-3.85

-3.85

France

-4.88

-4.88

-3.66

-3.66

Germany

-5.29

-5.29

-2.62

-2.62

Iceland

-4.32

-4.32

-3.24

-3.24

Ireland

-9.03

-9.03

-6.78

-6.78

Italy

-5.03

-5.03

-3.77

-3.77

Japan

-6.27

-6.27

-4.71

-4.71

Netherlands

-5.91

-5.91

-4.43

-4.43

New Zealand

-8.91

-8.91

-6.69

-6.69

Norway

-3.22

-3.22

-2.42

-2.42

Portugal

-3.09

-3.09

-1.53

-1.53

Slovenia

-2.48

-2.48

-1.86

-1.86

South Korea

-5.56

-5.56

-3.93

-3.93

Spain

-4.65

-4.65

-2.47

-2.47

Sweden

-4.35

-4.35

-3.27

-3.27

United States

-28.36

43.29

-35.55

28.91

Note: The percent change in tax revenue is percent difference in proposed-law tax revenue with respect to
current-law tax revenue by country. The percent change in affiliate’s reported profits is the percent change in the
difference in the sum of affiliates’ reported profits revenue under proposed law with respect to affiliates’ reported
profits under current law.
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There are three noteworthy findings in Table 9. First, every country, except the United
States, experiences a decrease in aggregate reported firm revenue. In contrast, the U.S.
experiences an increase in aggregate reported firm revenue as a result. Second, every country,
including the U.S., experiences a decrease in CIT revenue. In the case of the U.S., this finding
shows that the increase in the CIT tax base or aggregate reported firm revenue is not large
enough to offset the effect of the 20 percent reduction in the U.S. CIT rate. For the other
countries, the decrease in CIT revenues is proportional to the decrease in the country’s CIT tax
base as a result of the proposal because they do not change their current-law CIT rate. Third, and
most importantly for the purposes at hand, the estimated effect of the proposed reform on the
percent decrease in CIT revenues for the U.S. is 15 percentages points smaller using estimates
obtained from the Enforcement 1 model relative to that based on the First-generation model. In
sum, this exercise illustrates the practical importance of using a correctly specified model to
estimate the effect on reported profits of CIT-rate differentials for tax policy analysis.
6. Conclusions
As globalization increases so has international tax competition among countries to attract
foreign direct investment. The resulting CIT-rate differentials among countries is leading to
BEPS as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate countries to affiliates located
in low CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities thus increasing their
worldwide after-tax profits.
This paper seeks to gauge the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on BEPS. I
improve upon the existing literature by accounting for whether countries actually enforce their
transfer-pricing rules and when they have the incentive to do so because of the tax incentive
facing domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong evidence that correctly specifying the model
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of reported profits in the manner prescribed in this paper has important implications for the
correct choice of function form and a substantial effect on the estimated semi-elasticities of
reported profits. The main results are the following: the estimated semi-elasticity of BEPS is
equal to -3.5, meaning that a 10% increase in the tax rate differential between countries results in
a 35% decrease in reported earnings in the high tax country; when there is an increase in the
incentive for outbound profit shifting, firms that are located in countries with strict antiavoidance rules report 32% more profits than otherwise; when there is an increase in the
incentive for inbound profit shifting, firms with ultimate owners located in countries with strict
anti-avoidance rules report 10% less profits than otherwise.
I also conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy
analysis. I use my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an
estimate of this semi-elasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the
policy simulation. This exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a
correctly specified model (that takes into account enforcement) has a substantial effect on the
estimated tax revenue effect of the proposed reform.

44

Chapter II: Does Macroeconomic News Affect Monetary Policy Expectations and Asset
Prices? Evidence from Event Studies
1. Introduction
Government authorities and investors were strongly impacted by the market loanable
funds during the recent financial crisis. Since interest rates are prices of loanable funds, they play
a crucial rule in moments of economic instability, like the 2008-2010 Great Recession. Interest
rates are indirectly set by a country’s central bank; they increase (decrease) when a central bank
conducts contractionary (expansionary) open market operations in periods of economic
expansion (recession).
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. It influences interest rates
by setting the price that depositary institutions, such as banks, need to pay in order to borrow
reserves overnight (known as the discount rate) and by determining the level of reserve
requirements. Usually, depositary institutions prefer to trade excess reserves to met overnight
reserve requirements among another because it is less expensive and because there is a stigma
assisted with borrowing from the central bank (lender of last resort). In simpler terms, a
depository institution with excess cash lends to another depositary institution that needs to
quickly raise liquidity at a price called the federal fund rate, which is always lower than the
discount rate.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the branch of the Federal Reserve that
determines the federal fund rate target9 that can be reached by deciding the level of reserve
requirements and the discount rate. Indeed, the Federal Reserve indirectly sets the federal fund

9

This rate influences the effective federal funds rate through open market operations or by buying and selling of
government bonds (government debt). More specifically, the Federal Reserve decreases liquidity by selling
government bonds, thereby raising the federal funds rate because banks have less liquidity to trade with other banks.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve can increase liquidity by buying government bonds, decreasing the federal funds rate
because banks have excess liquidity for trade.
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rate. Whether the Federal Reserve wants to conduct expansionary or contractionary open market
operations depends on the state of the economy. If the FOMC believes the economy is growing
too fast and inflationary pressures are consistent with the Federal Reserve’s objective, the
Committee may set a higher federal funds rate target to control economic activity. In the
opposing scenario, the FOMC may set a lower federal funds rate target to stimulate the economy.
Therefore, the FOMC must observe the current state of the economy to determine the best course
of monetary policy that will maximize economic growth and achieve economic stability. The
federal funds rate influences other interest rates such as the prime rate, which is the rate banks
charge their customers for credit cards. Additionally, the federal funds rate indirectly influences
long-term interest rates such as mortgages, loans, and savings, in order to promote consumer
wealth and financial markets confidence.
As a consequence, a lot of research has been done in trying to understand the dynamics
behind monetary policy expectations and investments decision-making is essential for a central
bank and financial investors. By correctly predicting monetary policies, investors can build
accurate asset pricing models and potentially increase their return on investments. From the
perspective of the Federal Reserve, assessing the linkages between monetary policy expectations
and investors’ behavior is important in order to promote economic stability and reaffirm
confidence in financial markets when needed. Given that the Federal Reserve adjusts its open
market operation depending on the state of the economy, so should investors.
In this paper, I investigate the effect of macroeconomic news announcements on
monetary policies expectations and ultimately on financial markets in the United States. I
contribute to the existing literature by estimating the following: the effect of macroeconomic
news surprises on short and long-term monetary policy expectations calculated using federal
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funds rates and LIBOR rates;10 the effect of positive and negative macroeconomic news
announcements on monetary policy expectations; the effect of changes in short and long-term
monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic news
announcements compared to days of FOMC announcements. Differently from Gurkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2004); Doh and Connelly (2013) and Berge and Cao (2014), I compute a factor
analysis using federal funds futures and Eurodollar futures11 collected not only on days of FOMC
announcements, but also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are publically
announcement. To be more specific, I extended the event study to days of non-farm payroll,
initial job claims, gross domestic product (GDP), Institute for Supply Management (ISM)
survey, Consumer Price Index (CPI),12 consumer confidence index, University of Michigan
consumer sentiment index, retail sales13 and new home sales announcements. To simplify the
terminology used in this paper, I refer to the above indicators as “macroeconomic
indicators/news” announcements (to distinguish them from FOMC announcements). FOMC
announcement days are considered any day when there is an FOMC meeting followed by a
public testimony or a statement and days when the “minutes” comes out. These macroeconomic
indicators are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which identify financial
markets most followed economic releases. The methodology used is a Newy-West event study
on 2,387 announcement days from 1998 to 2016.
I conclude that short and long-term monetary policy expectations are affected by

10

LIBOR or ICE LIBOR (previously BBA LIBOR) is a benchmark rate that some of the world's leading banks
charge each other for short-term loans. The market expectations of the LIBOR rate are inbounded in the Eurodollar
futures.
11
Eurodollar futures are time deposits denominated in U.S. dollars at banks outside the United States, and thus are
not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. Eurodollar futures are based on the LIBOR rate that is a
benchmark rate that some of the world's leading banks charge each other for short-term loans. This is also used as an
estimate of bank lending costs.
12
Month to month percentage change.
13
Month to month percentage change.
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unexpected changes in non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer
confidence index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home
sales. Furthermore, I report evidence that financial investors expect interest rates to rise (fall)
when there are positive14 (negative) macroeconomic indicator announcements. Finally, the
reaction of financial markets on changes in both short and long-term monetary policy
expectations is larger in absolute value on days of macroeconomic indicator announcements
compared to days of FOMC announcement. However, it is important to note that asset prices and
volatility respond differently to news announcements (see results for details). Finally, I check for
robustness by subsampling my event study to announcements made exclusively during the latest
global financial crisis (December 2007-June 2010). In this latter case I observe that differently
from long-term monetary policy expectations, short-term monetary policy expectations are not
effected by macroeconomic news surprises, which occurs when the market over/under estimate
the true value of a macroeconomic indicator.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview
of the literature on the effect of FOMC announcements and macroeconomic indicator surprises
on asset prices and volatility. Section 3 provides an outline on the variable construction, data and
methodology. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis including the model, results and
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.

14

News is considered to be positive (negative) when the realized value is higher (lower) than the market forecast,
except for change in initial job claims when news is considered to be positive (negative) when the realized value is
lower (higher) than the market forecast.
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2. Literature review
This section begins with an overview of the literature on the effect of monetary policy
expectations on financial markets followed by an overview of the literature on the effect of
macroeconomic news surprises on financial markets.
The original literature suggests that changes in monetary policies are transferred to the
stock market via changes in the cost of capital and private wealth (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005).
Indeed, it is not surprising that US stocks and bonds do react to changes in monetary policy
expectations (Gurkaynak, Sack, & Swanson, 2004; Wongswan, 2009). For example, rising shortterm interest rates in the U.S. result in a decline in stock market prices and in an upward shift of
the yield curve (Rigobon & Sack, 2004). The impact that changes in monetary policies have on
financial market mainly depends on financial market’s current expectation of these policies,
which are deducted by following FOMC announcements and looking at the state of the economy.
Federal funds futures can be used to approximate investors’ monetary policy expectation (Berge,
2012; Berge & Cao, 2014; Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Doh & Connolly, 2013; Gospodinov &
Jamali, 2012, 2014; Gurkaynak et al., 2004; Hamilton, 1996; Robertson & Thornton, 1997).
Hamilton (1996) is the first research to use federal funds rates to calculate short and long-term
unexpected changes in monetary policy expectations (known as monetary policy surprises). He
computes them by taking the difference between a federal funds future observed on days of
FOMC announcements and its value before the announcement. Therefore, the estimated
difference captures financial markets unexpected changes in monetary policies. When the
difference is zero, it means that the financial markets have correctly predicted the Federal
Reserve’s action, so there are no surprises. When the difference is not zero, the financial markets
were not able to anticipate the monetary policy currently. When the difference is calculated using
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a federal funds future that matures in the current month, this difference captures short-term
monetary policy surprises. Differently from the short-run monetary policy expectations, the
three-month federal fund future is used to capture long-term monetary policy surprises.
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004), henceforth GSS, improved upon the existing
literature by showing that the effects of FOMC announcements on financial markets is not
driven by a single factor (changes in the federal funds rate target), but two factors. GSS offer an
alternative way to capture monetary policy expectations surprises by using both federal funds
futures and LIBOR rates. By computing a factor analysis, GSS summarize changes in short-term
and long-term monetary policy expectations with two factors: the target factor and path factors.
These factors have a structural interpretation as a “current federal funds rate target” factor and a
“future path of policy” factor.
The target and path factors estimated by GSS and the short and long term monetary
policy surprises introduced by Hamilton (1996) are intermittently used to access the effect of
monetary policy expectations on assets prices and market volatility. Overall, researchers have
found that there is a negative relationship between long term unexpected changed changes of
monetary policy (path factor) and asset prices, while there is a positive relationship between both
the target and path factor and the yield of corporate/treasury bonds (Berge & Cao, 2014;
Gospodinov & Jamali, 2014; Gurkaynak et al., 2004). According to GSS, one percentage point
contraction in the accompanying FOMC statement leads to a decline of 4.3 percent in the return
of the S&P500 as well as an increase of 47, 27 and 12 basis points in the yields of the two, five,
ten-years treasury note, respectively. These results, even if small, match the theory, which
suggest that there is an inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates. On the other
side, although the relationship between interest rates and the stock market is fairly indirect, it is
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difficult to predict in which direction to the stock market moves when there is a cut or increase in
interest rates.
According to Doh & Connolly (2013) the signs and statistical significance of the effect of
monetary policy expectations on financial markets are consistent before and after the latest
recession, but not their magnitude. For instance, the elasticity of asset prices and bond yields to
changes in monetary policy expectations are larger before the 2008-2009 financial crisis than
during the crisis. This could be explain by the fact that investors anticipated that the recession
was going to be long one and that the Federal Reserve was going to keep interest rates low for a
very long time.
A great deal of work has also been done on the effect of macroeconomic news
announcements on asset prices (Brenner, Pasquariello, & Subrahmanyam, 2009; Flannery &
Protopapadakis, 2002; Gospodinov & Jamali, 2012; Hardouvelis, 1987; Kim, McKenzie, & Faff,
2004; Scotti, 2013). Scotti (2013) shows that the surprise indexes are a parsimonious summary
measure of the state of the economy and its business cycle.15 Gospodinov & Jamali (2012) use
changes in non-farm employment, consumer confidence and industrial production as a
robustness check. They conclude that the implied volatility of the S&P500 no longer exhibits a
larger response to monetary policy surprises relative to its realized volatility when these
indicators are added into their model. Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser, & Vega (2010) conclude that
macroeconomic indicators announcements do not have the same effect on all asset prices.
Flannery at al. (2001) demonstrate that stock market returns are significantly correlated with
inflation and money growth. They estimate a GARCH model of daily equity returns, where

15

For example, if the unemployment rate is low it shows that the economy is performing well. When the
unemployment becomes suddenly high it is considered a negative surprise. If this indicator keeps staying negative it
might suggest that an anticipated recession is coming. Eventually market predictions of unemployment rate will
adjust to he “new low values”.
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realized returns and their conditional volatility depend on 17 macro series announcements.
While a lot of research has been done on the effect of monetary policy expectations and
macroeconomic news surprises on financial markets, very little has been done on the effect of
macroeconomic news surprises on monetary policy expectations. Someone might argue that
there is a simultaneous causality between macroeconomic news surprises and monetary policy
expectations: monetary policies influence the state of the economy and investors expectations of
macroeconomic news, but at the same time macroeconomic news influence the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy decision making (as argued in the introduction of this paper). In
reality, the chances that investors forecast short- and long-term macroeconomic indicators based
on the current monetary policy decision are very low since no one can correctly predict how long
it takes for a monetary stimulus to affect the real economy. This paper aims to fill the gaps
between the literatures described above by first estimating the effect of macroeconomic news
surprises on monetary policy expectation, and secondly by testing whether or not financial
markets react strongly to changes in monetary policy expectations on days of macroeconomic
news announcements compared to days of FOMC announcements.
3. Variable construction, data and methodology
This section describes in details the methodology used to calculate the target and path
factors as well as macroeconomic indicator surprises. Here, I also summarized the data used in
the empirical portion of the paper and their origin.
3.1. Target and path factors
As previously discussed, monetary policy expectations can be measured using federal
funds futures since they are excellent predictors of the federal funds rates (Hamilton, 2001). A
federal funds future can be viewed as the expected average price for federal funds in a particular
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contract month (Robertson & Thornton, 1997).16 Following Hamilton (1996), in this paper shortterm monetary policy surprises are calculated by subtracting the value of the current month
federal funds future before the release of a macroeconomic indictor or FOMC announcement to
its values on the announcement day, scaled by the remaining days to maturity, as the following:17

∆𝑖

,

∆𝑖

,

=
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(1)

is the monetary policy unexpected surprise of a federal funds future that expires in the

current month (zero means zero months ahead, so the current month);
observed on day, d, of month, m, that expires in the current month;
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is the federal funds future
is the federal funds future

observed on day, d, of month, m, that expires in the current month; d is the day of a month when a
monetary policy announcement is made, D is the total number of days in a month, m. Similarly, to (1),
equation (2) denotes long-term monetary policy surprises. These are calculated by taking the difference
between the expected federal funds future on the day when a macroeconomic news or FOMC meeting is
observed and its value the day before the announcement, scaled by the remaining days to the next
announcement, and by subtracting the short-term surprise calculated in equation (1), as the following:
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is the monetary policy surprise of a federal fund future that expires on month, n;

are the day of the next news announcement (both FOMC and macroeconomic news) and

the number of days in the month containing the next announcement, respectively.
In order to capture the monetary policy expectation embodied in the Eurodollar futures I
first need to subtract the value of the Eurodollar from 100 to isolate the LIBOR rate (L). Second,
I compute the following equation:
16

The future value of the federal fund rate is calculated by subtracting the contract price of the future from one
hundred.
17
If the event happened within the last seven days of a month I will use the following month future value to compute
the shock.
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Here
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is the value of the 3-month LIBOR rate at day, d, and month, m;

(3)
∝

,𝑑−

is the

value of the LIBOR rate before the macroeconomic announcement or FOMC meeting/minute
realized; ∝ is the quarter when the Eurodollar future matures.

In this paper, I use federal funds futures that expire at different maturities starting from

the current month to ten months ahead and Eurodollar futures that expire at different maturities
starting from the current quarter to ten quarters ahead. After calculating equations (1), (2) and (3)
on the eleven federal funds futures and eleven LIBOR rate on 2,310 announcement days, I
finally compute a factor analysis.18
As previously anticipated by GSS, I obtain two factors that summarize 88 percent 19 of all
variations in the monetary policy surprises calculated using equations (1), (2) and (3). These
factors are known as the target factor (short-term monetary policies expectations) and the path
factor (long-term monetary policies changes expectations). Figure 2 portrays values of path and
target factors from 1998 to 2016.

18

Details on the methodology used to compute the factor analysis are summarized in details by Doh & Connolly
(2013).
19
This number is calculated based on the factor loadings of each variable after the orthogonal rotation. Results are
available upon request.
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Figure 2. Target (short-term monetary policy expectations) and path factors (long-term monetary
policy expectations) from 1998 to 2016

Note: Author’s calculations. Values are expressed in basis points.
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According to Figure 2, since 2009 the target factor has been close to zero, while the path
factor has been more volatile. This implies that financial markets do not change their short-term
monetary policy beliefs as often as their long-term beliefs. Table 10 shows the top five largest
positive and negative changes in the target and path factors and their corresponding
macroeconomic events.

Table 10: Largest movements of the path and target factors
Largest movements of the Target Factor
Date

Target

Path

Macroeconomic release

22-Jan-08

-79.97

-19.62

FOMC

18-Sep-01

-41.71

27.22

CPI

18-Apr-01

-41.11

-16.86

FOMC

20-Sep-01

37.28

-14.95

Initial Job Claims

3-Jen-01

-35.00

35.55

FOMC

Largest movements of the Path Factor
Date

Target

Path

Macroeconomic release

5-Jun-09

0.18

86.42

Change in Non-Farm Payroll

29-Sep-08

16.62

66.02

FOMC

6-Aug-04

-2.03

-58.92

Change in Non-Farm Payroll

24-Jan-08

12.44

56.75

Initial Job Claims

05-Sep-03

5.64

-56.52

Change in Non-Farm Payroll

Source: Author’s calculations, Bloomberg Calendar.

According to Table 10, several outliers of both the target and the path factor are observed
on days when macroeconomic indicators are announced instead of days of FOMC
announcements. The top ten outliers listed in Table 10, correspond to the following economic
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news reported by the New York Times, CNN Money or Federal Reserve Board of Governor:


April 18th, 2001: the U.S. stocks rallied after the Federal Reserve rocked Wall Street with
a surprise interest rate cut, lifting hopes that corporate profits will recover sooner than
expected.



January 22nd, 2008: Federal Reserve makes the biggest Federal fund rate cut in nearly 24
years.



September 18th, 2001: this day was the first trading day after the September 11 attacks.
Plus, on September 17th, the Federal Reserve lowered the target rate of 50 basis points on
September 17th, 2001.



September 20th, 2001: jobless claims tumbled to 387,000 well below Wall Street
forecasts of 420,000. However, this day is well known as President Bush declaration of
“War on Terror” after the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2011.



January 3rd, 2001: the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan announced a surprise
interest rate cut.



June 5th, 2009: CNN Money reported “annual loss biggest since the end of World War II.
Unemployment rate rises to 7.2 percent”.



September 29th, 2008: The Federal Reserve dropped the target rate to 1 percent as the
pace of economic activity appears to have slowed remarkably.



August 6th, 2004: the job growth was weaker than the market expected.



January 24th, 2008: the $150 billion stimulus approved by the Bush administration
account its first difficulties.



September 5th, 2003: CNN money reports that defying private economists' forecasts for
an increase and highlighting fears that the labor market could be slow to catch up to
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stronger growth in the rest of the economy.
3.2. Macroeconomic indicators surprises
The macroeconomic indicators used in this paper have been selected based on their
Bloomberg relevance index.20 The latter identify the major macroeconomic indicators that
investors rigorously follow on Bloomberg. The Bloomberg relevance index for FOMC meetings
is currently 97.2, making it the third most relevant news to investors after changes in non-farm
payroll and job claims. The surprise index for each of the macroeconomic indicators listed in
Table 1121 is calculated as the following:
=

𝑖
𝑡−

[ 𝑡𝑖 |ℱ𝑖 ]

(4)

𝜎𝑖

Here, i represents one of the nine indicators listed in Table 12; t is the day when indicator
i was publically announced;

is the normalized surprise index of indicator i at time t;

is the

actual value of a macroeconomic indicators; m[ |ℱ ] is the median Bloomberg forecast of

indicator i; and𝜎 is the standard deviation of the forecasts of indicator i. Each indicator is

normalized to allow comparison between each other. I also create a dummy variable that is equal
to one when a macroeconomic surprise is positive and zero otherwise22:
𝛝𝐢 = {

=
=

𝐢𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐢 >
𝐢𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐢 <

Where ϑ is a dummy variable for negative (=0) or positive(=1) news.
20

The Bloomberg relevance is a number between zero to one hundred: zero meaning that investors never look at a
specific indictor when it comes out, one hundred meaning that investors always look at a specific indicators when it
comes out. It is based on the number of clicks on Bloomberg at the moment of the news release.
21 MBA Mortgage Applications is also a highly observed by financial markets but Bloomberg does not keep truck
of its forecast standard deviation making impossible to normalize the surprise component of this index. Indeed, this
index is excluded from the empirical analysis
22
Expect for changes in initial job claims that are equal to one if less than zero and zero otherwise.

58

Table 11: List of macroeconomic indicators and their Bloomberg relevance index
Indexes
Indicators

Relevance Index

Change In Non-Farm Payroll (NP)

99.2%

Initial Job Claims (JL)

98.4%

GDP (GDP)

96.8%

ISM (IMS)

95.9%

CPI MoM (CPI)

95.2%

Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)

94.4%

U. Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (UM)

93.6%

Retails Sales MoM (RS)

91.9%

New Home Sales (NSH)

90.3%

3.3. Data
Data on federal funds futures, Eurodollar futures, macroeconomic news forecast, S&P500
closing price and the VIX are collected from Bloomberg. Daily data on the yield curve are
downloaded from the U.S. Department of Treasury. The lists of days when a macroeconomic
indictor is released to the public or there is a FOMC announcement are collected from
Bloomberg and the Board of Governors. The summary statistics of all variables are available in
Table 12.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Target factor

0.104

3.910

-46.63

27.62

Path factor

0.0154

15.70

-54.88

72.32

Returns of the S&P 500

0.0601

1.260

-9.035

10.79

Three-months treasury bill

-0.507

4.823

-52

46.00

One-year treasury note

-0.386

4.316

-50

22

Ten-years treasury note

0.00216

6.351

-28.00

24.00

VIX

-9.025

166.6

-1310

1412

Dummy variable for good news

0.310

0.463

0

1

Change in Non-Farm Payroll Surprise

-0.0424

0.727

-8.190

6.350

GDP surprise

-0.0115

0.557

-5.670

5.900

-0.000909

0.925

-8

8.860

Retail Sales Surprise

-0.0102

0.536

-5.220

7.070

Initial Job Claims Surprise

0.00118

1.633

-27.58

12.55

Consumer Confidence Surprise

-0.0150

0.908

-9.070

7.980

University of Michigan Consumers
Confidence Index Surprise

-0.0445

1.009

-9.530

8.660

ISM Surprise

-0.00497

0.709

-11.85

6.380

CPI Surprise

-0.0117

0.415

-4.130

3.950

New Home Sales Surprise

Note: The total number of events is 2,387.
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4. Empirical estimation
4.1. Econometric model
The methodology used is a Newey-West event study on a predefined window of one day
between January 1998 and March 2016. The events included in this study are associated with the
public release of the nine indicators listed in Table 11 and FOMC announcements.
First, in order to investigate the effect of macroeconomic indicators announcements on
monetary policies expectations I estimate the following equation:
,𝑑

section 3.1;

,𝑑

+∑
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is the target or the path factor calculated on day d and month m as explained in
depends on news j (=1, ..,9); 𝑋

,𝑑

is a vector of macro news surprises calculated

on day d and month m as explained in section 3.2.
Second, in order to investigate the effect of positive and negative news announcements
on monetary policies expectations I estimate the following equation:
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is a dummy variable equal to one if a news is positive and zero otherwise.

Finally, I look at the effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets when
macroeconomic news are released compared to days of FOMC announcements using the
following equation:
,𝑑
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61

=

ℎ∗

+∑

=

∗

+

(7)

Here,

is a dummy variable equal to one on the day when a macroeconomic indicator i

is observed and 0 otherwise; i corresponds to following indicators: non-farm payroll, initial job
claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of Michigan consumer
sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales;

identifies whether or not long-term

(short-term) monetary policy expectations have a larger or smaller effect on financial markets on
days of a macroeconomic news announcement compared to days of FOMC announcements. In
equation (7), the base group corresponds to days of FOMC announcements and their interaction
terms with target and path factors.
4.2. Results
Table 13 reports the estimates of equations (5) and (6). Table 14 shows the results
obtained after estimating equation (7). According to Table 13, macroeconomic news surprises do
effect monetary policy expectations. Surprises in macroeconomic news announcements have a
larger effect on long-term monetary policy expectations (Table 13 column 2) than short ones
(Table 13 column 3). As visible in Table 13 column 2, the elasticity of long-term monetary
policy expectations to changes in non-farm payroll, retails sales, initial job claims, the University
of Michigan consumer sentiment, the ISM, GDP and CPI are statistically significant at the
conventional level of significance. As expected all variables have a positive sign except for job
claims. If initial job claims are higher than expected, financial markets believe that interest rates
should consequently decrease.
According to Table 13 column 3, even if the coefficients of non-farm payroll, GDP, CPI,
consumer confidence and new home sales surprises are positive and statistically significant at the
conventional level of significance, their effects on short-term monetary policy expectations
(target factor) are quite small. For instance, if the surprise index of changes in non-farm payroll
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increases by one standard deviation, short-term monetary policy expectations rise by only 0.37
basis points after the increase. These results suggest that when macroeconomic news indicators
are greater than financial markets have previously forecasted, investors believe that interest rates
should soon rise as the economy stabilizes.
Finally, positive (negative) news has a positive (negative) effect on both long- and shortterm monetary policy expectations as visible in Table 13 columns 4 and 5, respectively. When
news is positive (negative), investors expect the Federal Reserve to increase (decrease) federal
funds rates in the short and long-term via expansionary (contractionary) open market operations.
The elasticity of macroeconomic news surprises on monetary policy expectations are larger in
absolute value for the path factor compared to the target one. These results suggest that longterm monetary policy expectations are more sensitive to unexpected changes of macroeconomic
indicators than short-term monetary policy expectations.
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Table 13: The effect of macroeconomic indicator surprises on monetary policy expectations
Factors
Variables

Path

Target

Change in non-farm payroll
surprise

4.913***

0.372*

(0.725)

(0.219)

Initial job Claims surprise

-0.981***

-0.0378

(0.283)

(0.0396)

1.145**

0.154*

(0.582)

(0.0883)

2.766***

0.0827

(0.602)

(0.339)

1.605*

0.297*

(0.870)

(0.170)

0.419

0.0830**

(0.343)

(0.0393)

University of Michigan
consumer sentiment index
surprise

0.647**

0.0348

(0.283)

(0.0433)

Retail sales surprise

2.681***

0.0304

(0.549)

(0.0494)

0.406

0.0442*

(0.349)

(0.0264)

GDP surprise

ISM surprise

CPI surprise

Consumer confidence index
surprise

New home sales surprise

Positive News

Constant

Observations

Path

Target

5.638***

0.374*

(0.697)

(0.214)

0.249

0.0724

-2.766***

-0.130

(0.329)

(0.0998)

(0.470)

(0.141)

2,387

2,387

2,387

2,387

Note: The path factor represents long-term monetary policy expectations; the target factor represents
short-term monetary policy expectations.
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Table 14 displays the elasticity of the return of the S&P500, 23 the VIX, the three-months
bill, one- and ten-years Treasury note to changes in the target and path factors as indicated in
equation (7). According to Table 14 Colum 2, changes in the target (path) factor have a negative
(positive) effect on the returns of the S&P500 on days of FOMC announcements. The response
of the return of the S&P500 to changes in long-term monetary policy expectations (path factor)
on days of ISM is greater and statistically significant at the conventional level of significance
compared to days of FOMC announcements. Similarly, the return of the S&P500 is greater in
absolute value when there are changes in short-term monetary policy expectations and
statistically significant at the conventional level of significance on days of non-farm payroll
compared to days of FOMC announcements.
On the other side, the VIX is not affected by changes in long-term monetary policy
expectations, but only by short ones (Table 14 Colum 3). The VIX is more affected (absolute
value) on days of non-farm payroll, GDP and CPI compared to days of FOMC announcement.
On the contrary, the effect of changes in the target factor on the VIX on days when the
University of Michigan consumer sentiment index is announced is smaller in absolute value
compared to days of FOMC announcements. For instance, if the target factor increases by 25
basis points, the VIX is 113 basis points lower on days when the University of Michigan
consumer sentiment index is announced compared to the base group.
Focusing now our attention to the Treasury yield curve, an increase in the target factor
has a positive effect on the three month, one- and ten-years treasury notes as reported in Table 5
column 4, 5, 6 respectively. Oppositely, changes in the path factor affect only the ten-years
Treasury note. An increase in the target factor on days of changes in job-market claims have a

The returns of the S&P500 are calculated as the following: =
is the closing price of the day before the event was announced.
23
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+

−

where r is the rate of return and P

larger positive effect on the three-months Treasury bill compared to FOMC announcements.
Changes in the target factor on days of ISM releases have a negative effect on the three-months
Treasury bill compared to the same movement of the target factor on days of FOMC
announcements. Similarly, changes in the target factor on days of initial job claims, retail sales
and new home sales have a larger effect in, absolute value, on the one-year Treasury note
compared to days of FOMC announcement. The ten-years bond is positively (negatively)
affected by changes in the target factor on days of ISM (non-farm payroll, consumer confidence
index and retail sales) announcement compared to days of FOMC announcements. The
difference in signs, coefficient magnitudes and statistical significances depends on the
importance that investors give to macroeconomic news release and how they effect their
monetary policy expectations. The results discussed above signal that investors do change their
monetary policy expectations on days when other macroeconomic indicators come out, and not
only on days of FOMC. It also shows that the effect of these changes on financial markets is
pronounced on days when several macroeconomic indicators come out compared to days of
FOMC announcements. The latter suggests that financial markets do follow macroeconomic
indicators and set their monetary policy expectations based on their forecast of the economy;
when these forecast are not met, financial markets strongly react.
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Table 14: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of
macroeconomic indicators announcements compared to FOMC announcement

Variables

S&P500

VIX

3 Month
Note

One-year
Bill

Ten-years
Bond

Path

0.019**

-2.203*

0.033

0.166***

0.333***

(0.008)

(1.187)

(0.029)

(0.014)

(0.016)

-0.011

-3.963

0.651***

0.531***

-0.103*

(0.026)

(2.871)

(0.158)

(0.092)

(0.063)

-0.048

-22.580*

0.545*

0.014

-0.283

(0.103)

(13.390)

(0.319)

(0.228)

(0.351)

-0.076

13.380

-0.210

-0.281*

-0.616***

(0.069)

(9.515)

(0.252)

(0.169)

(0.204)

0.030

-21.400*

-0.037

0.049

-0.380

(0.088)

(11.840)

(0.278)

(0.179)

(0.272)

0.015

19.070

1.301***

0.533**

-0.093

(0.102)

(14.310)

(0.418)

(0.249)

(0.307)

-0.075

-5.500

-0.673**

-0.222

-0.398

(0.103)

(13.870)

(0.316)

(0.201)

(0.313)

0.024

-10.970

0.107

0.010

-0.300

(0.152)

(19.160)

(0.312)

(0.217)

(0.269)

-0.110

6.635

0.338

0.016

-0.720***

(0.077)

(10.060)

(0.310)

(0.223)

(0.236)

-0.125

22.930

-0.345

0.018

0.388

(0.121)

(17.430)

(0.251)

(0.154)

(0.348)

0.006

-5.565

0.646*

0.106

0.018

(0.096)

(11.320)

(0.373)

(0.206)

(0.253)

-0.008

0.874

0.019

0.003

-0.049**

Target

Change In Non-Farm
Payroll (NP)
Initial Job Claims (JL)

GDP (GDP)

ISM (IMS)

CPI MoM (CPI)

Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI)
U. Michigan Consumer
Confidence Index (UM)
Retails Sales MoM (RS)

New Home Sales (NSH)

NP×Path
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NP×Targer

JL×Path

JL×Targer

GDP×Path

GDP×Targer

ISM×Path

ISM×Targer

CPI×Path

CCI×Path

CCI×Targer

UM×Path

UM×Targer

RS×Path

RS×Targer

(0.009)

(1.162)

(0.032)

(0.020)

(0.022)

-0.048*

6.816***

0.075

0.087

-0.175**

(0.027)

(2.482)

(0.187)

(0.138)

(0.077)

0.001

0.099

0.026

0.026

0.002

(0.008)

(0.997)

(0.030)

(0.018)

(0.017)

0.030

-2.365

0.231*

0.171*

0.0277

(0.025)

(3.299)

(0.129)

(0.088)

(0.064)

-0.009

0.703

-0.019

-0.025

0.0172

(0.007)

(1.064)

(0.019)

(0.020)

(0.020)

-0.087*

21.040**

0.035

-0.001

-0.230

(0.049)

(9.249)

(0.314)

(0.158)

(0.155)

0.017*

-2.334

0.039

0.032

0.016

(0.010)

(1.435)

(0.034)

(0.022)

(0.023)

0.024

2.392

-0.529***

-0.390***

0.344***

(0.025)

(3.127)

(0.153)

(0.094)

(0.064)

-0.011

0.389

0.009

-0.014

0.003

(0.010)

(1.127)

(0.037)

(0.024)

(0.039)

0.017

-2.828

0.0167

-0.011

0.037

(0.014)

(1.912)

(0.029)

(0.023)

(0.023)

-0.044

17.350

-0.410

-0.020

-0.230*

(0.170)

(21.300)

(0.282)

(0.144)

(0.139)

-0.001

0.371

0.027

0.034

0.017

(0.007)

(0.833)

(0.033)

(0.025)

(0.018)

0.037

-4.536*

-0.277

-0.121

0.116

(0.025)

(2.383)

(0.209)

(0.159)

(0.081)

0.005

0.248

0.022

-0.00537

-0.001

(0.010)

(1.379)

(0.027)

(0.015)

(0.024)

0.113

-12.560

0.482

0.350*

-0.896**
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NSH×Path

NSH×Targer

Constant

Observations

(0.135)

(17.850)

(0.402)

(0.188)

(0.368)

-0.006

0.418

0.067

0.007

0.015

(0.009)

(1.022)

(0.041)

(0.021)

(0.020)

0.030

5.109

-0.489

0.561**

-0.315

(0.103)

(9.183)

(0.577)

(0.262)

(0.238)

0.115

-12.820

-0.638***

-0.369**

0.476**

(0.070)

(9.385)

(0.230)

(0.149)

(0.197)

2,387

2,387

2,387

2,387

2,387

Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis
(HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed in percentage for the S&P500 and in basis points for everything else.

Table 17 in the Appendix displays the sum of the coefficients
along with their joint test of statistical significance. The sum of

and

and
(of

, and

and

and

indicates the effect of changes in the path factor (target factor) on the return of the S&P500,
VIX, three-months treasury bill, one-year treasury note and the ten-years treasury note for nine
macroeconomic news releases and FOMC announcements.
Changes in the path and target factors have a positive effect on all dependent variables
except the VIX. This suggests that changes in short-term monetary policy expectations have a
negative effect on the volatility of the S&P500 independently on the announcement. For
example, if the target factor increases by 25 basis points on days when the latest values of the
ISM index are released to the public, the VIX is expected to increase by 598 basis points.
On the contrary, changes in short-term monetary policy expectations have a positive
effect on the three-months Treasury bill and one-year Treasury note while it has diversified
effects on the return of the S&P500, the VIX and the ten-years Treasury bond. For instance, one
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basis point change in the target factor on days of GDP announcements is expected to decrease
the return S&P500 by 5.9 percent. Once again these later results suggest that when
macroeconomic forecast are not met, investors change their short and long term monetary policy
expectations, which untimely effect financial markets. These macroeconomic indicators are
extremely important and often capable of shaking the stock and bond markets more than direct
announcements on interest rates by Federal Reserve announcements.
4.3. Global recession
In this section, I subsample the event studies to announcements made during the latest
global financial crisis (December 2007-June 2009) as a robustness check. Just like Table 13,
Table 15 reports the estimates of equations (5) and (6), but only for the events that happened
during the latest financial crisis. According to the results, short-term monetary policy
expectations, the target factor (columns 3 and 5, Table 15), are not affected by macroeconomic
news surprises, while long-term monetary policy expectations, the path factors (columns 2 and 4,
Table 15) are affected by unexpected released values of non-farm payroll, initial job claims,
GDP, ISM and retail sales. This makes sense since short-term expectations of monetary policies
and the state of the economy have not changed in the short run over this period of time. In order
words, during the latest financial crisis financial markets were able to anticipate the short-term
spam of the recession. On the other side, the end of the recession was uncertain. Indeed, changes
in macroeconomic indicators (even if small) had a large effect on long-term expectations of
monetary policies (path factor), but not on the short one (target factor).
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Table 15. The effect of macroeconomic indicator surprises on monetary policy expectations
during the latest global financial crisis
Factors
Variables

Path

Target

Change in non-farm Payroll Surprise 4.359***

Initial job Claims surprise

Path

Target

4.716***

-0.164

(0.949)

(0.265)

0.553

(1.112)

(0.533)

1.257***

-0.0155
(0.0363)

(0.265)
GDP surprise

ISM surprise

CPI surprise

C.C.I. ** surprise

University of Michigan consumer
sentiment index surprise
Retail sales surprise

New home sales surprise

1.283**

0.225

(0.526)

(0.166)

1.860***

-0.445

(0.615)

(0.557)

2.027

0.336

(1.384)

(0.243)

0.133

0.0563

(0.371)

(0.0475)

0.599*

0.0457

(0.335)

(0.0534)

2.469***

-0.0798

(0.555)

(0.0670)

-0.112

0.0157

(0.406)

(0.0222)

Positive News

Constant

0.330

-0.0300

-2.101***

0.0318

(0.414)

(0.124)

(0.631)

(0.153)
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Note: The path factor represents long-term monetary policy expectations; the target factor represents
short-term monetary policy expectations. The event window is from December 2007 to June 2009. **
Consumer Confidence Index . 1,154 Total observations

Estimates in Table 18 in the Appendix are very similar to the one reported in Table 17 in
the Appendix. Changes in the path factor, when statistically significant at the conventional level
of significance, have a positive effect on the return of the S&P500, the three-month Treasury bill,
the one-year Treasury note and the ten-years Treasury note, independently on the announcement.
On the contrary, changes in the target factor have a negative effect on the return of the S&P500
and the ten-years treasury note (except for days when the ISM was announced), while it has a
positive effect on the VIX, three-months treasury note and the one-year treasury bill. Overall,
Changes in the path and target factor on all dependent variables are very small. Once again these
results underline the importance of macroeconomic announcements and suggest that even during
the latest recession financial markets were changing their monetary policy expectations based on
the state of the economy. It is not surprising that changes in long term expectations had a larger
effect on financial markets because of investor’s uncertainty.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, similar to Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004), I compute a principle
component analysis using federal funds futures and the LIBOR to capture short and long-run
financial markets’ monetary policy expectations in the United States. Differently from the
current literature I use data on federal funds futures and eurodollar futures collected not only on
days of FOMC meeting but also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are announced
(namely change in non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence
index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales).
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These macroeconomic indicators are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which
identify investors most followed announcements on Bloomberg.
Finally, after computing an event study I make three important contributions to the
current literature: first, monetary policy expectations are affected by unexpected values of nonfarm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of
Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sale; second, interest rates are
expected to rise (fall) as a consequence of positive (negative) macroeconomic indicators and
FOMC announcements; third, financial markets not only react to changes of short- and long-term
monetary policy expectations on days of FOMC meetings, but also on days when other
macroeconomic news are publically announced.
These results suggest that investors adjust their monetary policy expectations based on
the state of the economy and that financial markets are vulnerable to surprises in macroeconomic
news as well as FOMC announcements. These results emphasize the importance of a transparent
and well thought communication between the Federal Reserve and financial investors in order to
promote stability and stimulate investments.

73

Chapter III: The Impact of China’s Economic Slowdown and United States’ New Trade
Policy on both the United States and China

1. Introduction
International trade and globalization are shaping the face of a new global economy and
redirecting the stream of cash flow to low cost production countries. In the past decades, China
has become the heart of the global economy, importing and exporting a large range of products
to and from the world. Therefore, governments and in particular financial markets around the
globe strongly react when China shows signs of economic slowdown (e.g. August 2015 and
January 2016).24 Given the exposure of China to other global economies, it is not surprising that
policy institutions worldwide are constantly monitoring its economic development.
According to Zilio (2016), China is a major U.S. trading partner (by far the United States'
largest source of imported goods as well as an increasingly important destination for U.S.-made
products). The United States’ other large trading partners have over the years also become more
and more reliant on China's economy. For this reason, United States’ investors and policy
makers are concerned about China's economic performance and its possible effect on the United
States economy. According to the World Bank and the OECD data, China economic growth
(year over year) has been slowing down over the decades. 25 A slowdown in China's economic
activity could strongly affect international trade and deliver a negative shock to the United
States. Additionally, upcoming trade reforms in the United States (e.g. the border-adjustment
tax) could have a strong impact on the trade dynamics between China and the United States.

24

Financial markets around the globe reacted strongly in August 2015, when China started showing signs of
economic slowdown. Financial markets weakened again in January 2016, when Chinese stocks fell dramatically
after further devaluation of the Yuan.
25
Going from its highest growth rate of 6.4 percent in 1965 to its lowest (-1.7 percent) in 2009, during the global
financial crisis, to finally settle between 2-3 percent growth rate since 2011.
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Clearly, trade is not the only channel through which China's slowdown could hold back
economic growth in the U.S. A number of other dynamic mechanisms (including financial
market volatility, consumer and business confidence, and exchange rates) might also affect
American growth. This is why dynamic general equilibrium models are a better fit to attempt to
explain the behavior of supply, demand, and prices in a whole economy with several or many
interacting markets.
In this paper I investigate the effects of a negative productivity shock in China and two
simultaneous trade shocks in the United States and China using a stochastic general equilibrium
model previously introduced by Ghironi & Melitz (2005). 26
In general, stochastic growth models for closed and open economies account for the
magnitude of fluctuations, relative to output, in consumption and investment and the correlations
of these fluctuations with output. In the Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model, in open economies, like
the United Sates, their demand and supply are not only affected by their internal production. This
also means that risks and shocks are shared across countries (both consumption risk and
investment risk). The vast majority of international macroeconomic models take the pattern of
international trade and the structure of markets for goods and factors of production as given. The
determinants of such trade patterns are analyzed within methodologically distinct models that are
generally limited to comparisons of long-run positions or growth dynamics after changes in
trade’s determinants. Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model fully address this weakness by including
the determinants and evolution of trade patterns in their model. In this case, firms face sunk entry
cost and uncertainty when making an irreversible decision to enter the domestic market. Firm’s
productivity and costs change over time, but only a small group of firms serve the international

26

DSGE models study how the economy evolves over time. They are called stochastic when they take into account
the fact that the economy is affected by random shocks such as technological change and price fluctuations.
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market (the most productive ones). Indeed, this microeconomic structure endogenously
determines the production and consumption of each country and it is affected by exogenous
shocks to aggregate productivity, entry and trade.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at the literature review on both static and
stochastic equilibrium models. Section 3 discusses the motivation behind the selection of shocks
used in this paper. Section 4 summarizes Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model including their
equilibrium, steady state conditions and parameters. Section 5 discusses the impulse response
functions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
In this section, I discuss the current literature on the static and dynamic effects of a
country shock within and across its borders (focusing on the United States and China).
To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies that look at the effect of fast
growing countries slowing down the global economy (Ben-David & Papell, 1998; Eichengreen,
Park, & Shin, 2011; Fernald, Edison, & Loungani, 1999; Pritchett, 2000; Reddy & Minoiu,
2009). Ben-David and Papell (1998) examine a sample of 74 advanced and developing countries
spanning the period 1950-1990 and look for statistically significant breaks in time series for GDP
growth rates. They find that while most industrialized countries experienced postwar growth
slowdowns in the early 1970s, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom did not.
Developing countries -in particular Latin American countries- tended to experience much more
severe slowdowns which occurred nearly a decade after the developing countries. Using
international data from 1957 to 2013, Eichengreen, Park, & Shin (2011) conclude that rapidly
growing economies slow down significantly (the growth rate downshifts by at least 2 percentage
points) when their per capita incomes reach around $17,000. Among their more provocative
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findings is that growth slowdowns are more likely in countries that maintain undervalued real
exchange rates (as if countries with undervalued currencies have less incentive to move up the
technological ladder out of unskilled-labor intensive, low-value-added sectors and thus find it
more difficult to sustain rapid growth). Fernald, Edison, & Loungani (1999) assess the linkages
between China and the rest of emerging Asia, arguing that the devaluation of the yen in 1994
contributed to the Asian financial crisis. The transmission of this shock took the following path:
if China’s exchange rate depreciates, Chinese exports become more competitive, exceeding the
export rate of other Asian economies. This causes a reduction in capital inflows, which
diminishes job creation and slows down the Chinese economy.
Pritchett (2000) examines cases of developing countries where growth is sustained for a
period and then stagnates or collapses. He compares what happens to developed and developing
countries. He concludes that volatility in growth is much greater in developing countries than in
developed ones. In a similar study by Reddy and Miniou (2009), stagnation is found to be more
prevalent in poor, conflict ridden, commodity-exporting countries than in developed countries.
The majority of the models described above are static and do not allow the researcher to
fully control for intertemporal, cross-country shocks transmission. To solve this issue, over the
past decade there has been remarkable progress precisely estimating dynamic models (mainly
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models).
Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1992) extend the existing theory on economic growth to a
competitive model of a world economy with a single homogeneous good and internationally
immobile labor. They conclude that poor but quickly growing countries borrow less from richer,
more slowly growing countries than the theory suggests. Ghironi & Melitz (2005) bridge the gap
between international macroeconomics and trade theory using Melitz’s (2003) model of trade
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with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms as the microeconomic underpinning of a
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of international trade. They provide
an explanation of why more productive economies, or less regulated ones (phenomena that affect
all firms in the economy) exhibit higher average prices relative to their trading partners (HarrodBalassa- Samuelson effect). Furthermore, they show that, with fully flexible prices, deviations
from production possibility frontier display substantial endogenous persistence in response to
transitory aggregate shocks. The Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model is often used in the DSGE
literature (Arkolakis, Costinot, & Rodríguez-Clare, 2012; Atkeson & Burstein, 2008; Backus et
al., 1992; Eaton, Kortum, & Kramarz, 2011; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Shapiro & Mandelman,
2016) because it closely matches several moments of U.S. and international business cycles.
Given the increasing attention that investors and policy makers are giving to China’s
development, DSGE models that focus solely on the Chinese economy have been increasing over
time (Bin, 2008; Chen, Funke, & Paetz, 2012; Zhang, 2009). Bin (2008) builds a DSGE model
with financial-accelerator for monetary policy analysis and applies the Bayesian technique to
account for China’s business cycle. Chen, Funke & Paets (2012) develops a New Keynesian
DSGE model to capture China’s unconventional monetary policy toolkit. They find that credit
quotas are important as the interest-rate corridor distorts the efficient reactions of the economy.
Zhang (2009) explores two monetary policy rules- the money supply (quantity) rule and interest
rate (price) rule in his DSGE model specifically designed to reflect the Chinese economy. The
empirical results seem to indicate that the price rule is likely to be more effective in managing
the price than the quantity rule, favoring the government’s intention of liberalizing interest rates
and making more active use of the price instrument. According to Chen at al. (2012), China’s
monetary policy approach has three main features. First, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC)
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regulates the policy rate, the retail lending rate and the deposit rate. Second, they use non-market
tools such as loan quotas and window guidance to directly affect depositary institutions landing
strategies. Third, they set the required reserve ratio. Considering that monetary policy instability
may cause indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium, their paper derives the boundary
condition between determinacy and indeterminacy in a small open economy DSGE model. They
then use this model to investigate China's monetary policy and macroeconomic fluctuations
under indeterminacy during the period from 1992 to 2011. The empirical results show that the
nominal interest rate reacts not only to inflation and output gap, but also to the changes in their
currency exchange rate. Moreover, the indeterminacy in the macro-dynamics indicates the
instability in China's monetary policy stems from two sources- the sunspot shock and the
indeterminate propagation of fundamental shocks. In addition, they find that the monetary policy
shock affects macroeconomic dynamics significantly in the short run. While in the long run it
only influences nominal variables, such as inflation and the exchange rate, but not the real
output.
Since the aim of this paper is to shed light on the effect of China’s economic slowdown
on the US economy, I use Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) DSGE model. Their model is a stochastic
general equilibrium two-country model of trade and macroeconomic dynamics. This paper
differs from the literature because it specifically looks at the case of the United States and China.
Because the results highlight the dynamic effect of two current and highly discussed policy
issues in the United States (namely China’s economic growth slow down and the borderadjustment tax), this paper is particularly relevant to policy makers.
3. Motivation
China’s economic slowdown has been at the center of the attention of U.S. policymakers
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and investors, who are concerned about how China’s economic performance could affect the
United States economy. For example, in the minutes of its June 14–15, 2016 meeting, the
Federal Open Market Committee stated, "continued uncertainty regarding the outlook for China's
foreign exchange policy and the relatively high levels of debt in China and some other EMEs
[emerging market economies] represented appreciable risks to global financial stability and
economic performance". In order to investigate this issue I look at the dynamic effect of a
negative technological shock to China’s productivity and its transmission to the United States
using Ghironi & Melitz (2005)’s DSGE model.
Regarding the trade policy, policy makers (mostly those in the Republican Party) have
been pushing to replace America’s current tax on corporate profits with a system that raises the
costs of imports while helping exports by adding a tax on imports and a subsidy on exports.
Companies currently deduct practically all of their costs, including imports, from their sales
revenue and then pay taxes on the remaining profits. This new policy, known as a borderadjustment tax, essentially involves ending the deductibility of imports so that they would be
taxed on their worldwide income. At the same time, profits on exports would no longer be taxed,
and the overall tax rate would be cut. Many countries, but not the United States already have a
form of national sales tax on imports and exports are exempt from value-added taxes. Currently
China’s average tariffs are about three times as high as those in the United States (New York
Times, 2017). Lower American trade barriers have helped China to increase exports to the
United States, while importing fairly little from the U.S.. In order to investigate this issue I look
at the effect of a positive shock in U.S. trade costs (subsidy) and a negative shock in China’s
trade costs (tariff) to both the United States and China using Ghironi & Melitz (2005) DSGE
model.
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3. The model
3.1. Summary of the model and the equilibrium conditions
Once again, the model used in this paper is a stochastic, general equilibrium, two-country
model of trade and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005). DSGE
models have a simple structure, built around three interrelated blocks: a demand block, a supply
block, and a monetary policy equation. A key advantage of DSGE models is that they share core
assumptions on the behavior of households and firms, which makes them easily accessible to
modify details that are relevant to address the question at hand. The equations that define these
blocks derive from microfoundations and explicit assumptions about the behavior of the main
economic actors in the economy (namely households, firms, and the government). These agents
interact in markets that clear every period, which leads to the “general equilibrium” feature of the
models.
The Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model has the advantage of inclusion international trade
patterns into the standard DSGE model. Their model has the following interesting features:
productivity differs across individual; there are monopolistically competitive firms in each
country; firms face a sunk entry cost in the domestic market, both fixed, and per-unit export
costs; only relatively more productive firms export (the export cutoff defines the level of
productivity); firms face some initial uncertainty concerning their future productivity when
making an irreversible investment to enter the domestic market. Furthermore, in their model
exogenous shocks (such as aggregate productivity shocks, changes in domestic market
regulation, and changes in trade policy) alter the composition of consumption baskets across
countries over time by pushing firms into and out of the market. Differently from the other
models, Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) model generates endogenously persistent deviations from the
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production possibility frontier that would not exist absent with heterogeneous firms. Also their
model predicts that more productive economies, or less regulated ones, exhibit higher average
prices relative to their trading partners. This real exchange rate appreciation is driven by entry
and endogenous non-tradedness, the two key new features of Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) model
setup. 27
Table 16 in the Appendix reports the equilibrium conditions of Ghironi & Melitz (2005)
DSGE model. The variables that strictly correspond to the home country (the United States) do
not have an asterisk on top. The variables that strictly correspond to foreign country (China) do
have an asterisk on top. Table 1 summarizes the nineteen endogenous variables of the model:
(real wage in the home country),

∗

(real wage in the foreign country), ̃ (the average firm

profit of home producers’ domestic sales), ̃ ∗ (the average firm profit of foreign producers’

domestic sales),

,

∗

(the number of firms entering the home market),

,

(the number firm

entering the foreign market), 𝑋̃ , (export cut off in the home country), 𝑋,
̃ ∗ (export cut off in the
foreign country),

,

(the number of domestic firms selling only in the home country),

number of domestic firms selling only in the foreign country),
in the home country),

∗
𝑋,

𝑋,

∗

(the

(the risk-free

(the risk-free interest rate in the foreign country), ̃ (the

entry cost in the home country), ̃ ∗ (the entry cost in the foreign country),
consumption in the home country),

,

(the number of exporter firms

(the number of exporter firms in the foreign country),

interest rate in the home country),

∗

∗

(the household

(the household consumption in the foreign country),

(the exchange rate between the two countries, from the perspective of the home country).
Additionally the model includes eight exogenous variables: the aggregate productivities
∗
27

, and several policy variables,

,

(sunkentry cost in the home country),

∗
,

For more details on the structure of the DSGE model please see Ghironi & Melitz (2005).
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and

(sunk entry cost in

the foreign country),

𝑋,

(fixed trade costs in the home country),

∗
𝑋,

(fixed trade costs in the

foreign country), 𝜏 (trade cost in the home country/iceberg cost), 𝜏 ∗ (trade cost in the foreign
country/ iceberg cost). Changes in

,

,

∗
,

can be interpreted as changes in market regulation

facing a country’s firms in the respective domestic markets. Changes in
represent changes in trade policy.

𝑋,

,

∗
𝑋,

, 𝜏 and 𝜏 ∗

3.2. Calibration
In the following section, I summarize the calibration used in this paper. I adopt the same
calibration as Ghironi & Melitz (2005) since they were able to match numerous moments of the
United States and international business cycle. In thus paper, differently from Ghironi & Melitz’s
(2005), China’s trade iceberg costs are larger then (and not equal to) the United States once in
order to reflect the current trade patterns between China and the United Sates (China has higher
trade costs).
The discount factor, , is 0.99 for the both countries, while the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is is equal to 2.28 Periods are interpreted as quarters. The exogenous exit shock, δ is
0.25 to match the U.S. empirical level of 10 percent job destruction per year. The elasticity of
substitution across goods (θ) is 3.8 in order to fit the U.S. plant and macro trade data from
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003). The choice of θ = 3.8 then implies k = 3.4 (this
satisfies the requirement k>θ −1). Export firms in the United States have a trade iceberg cost29
(τ) of 1.5 to reflect the trade cost difference reported in the new York Times’s article titles

28

Both standard chooses for business cycle models.
Iceberg trade costs mean that for each good that is exported a certain fraction melts away during the trading
process as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. The model yields a simple micro-founded gravity equation
from which the implied international trade costs can be inferred. This indirect approach results in a comprehensive
measure of trade barriers that is both intuitive and easy to compute. For each good shipped, 1/(1 + τ ) goods arrive at
destination. The iceberg costs is an exogenous cost to transportation that diminishes over time. Variation in pricing
across export markets is determined entirely by iceberg trade cost factor.
29
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“Building Trade barriers” (New York Times, 2017). In the United States, fixed trade costs (fx)
equals 23.5 percent of the pre-period to match the proportion of exporting plants of 21 percent as
reported by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003). China’s trade iceberg cost (τ*) is set to be
1.3. The sunk cost in both countries, (fE) is set to one. The calibration implies that on average,
exporters in the U.S. are 65.4 percent more productive than importers. The steady-state share of
expenditure on nontraded domestic goods is 0.78.
3.3. Impulse responses
Figure I shows the impulse responses (percent deviations from steady state) to a
permanent 1 percent decrease in China’s productivity while Figure II shows the impulse
responses to a permanent 20 percent decrease in the trade iceberg costs of the United States and a
permanent 20 percent increase in trade iceberg costs for China. The number of quarters after the
shock is on the horizontal axis.
In Figure I, a negative technology shock in China results in a less attractive domestic
market for Chinese producers. Consequently, the number of new American firms entering the
United States increases while the number of new Chinese firms entering in China decreases. This
translates into a permanently higher number of producers in the United States and in contrast a
permanently lower number of producers in China. In other words, the number of new entrant
firms (Ne) represents the United States consumer investments, which increases at first, adding
firms to the stock of already producing firms (Nd). In China, the immediate impact of the
productivity shock reduces the supply of Chinese effective labor units relative to foreign. The
labor shortage bids up the price of Chinese labor in the United States in the short run, which
increases the Chinese export cutoff (zx*). The US export cutoff also increases due to a temporary
decline in foreign demand. Therefore, both countries experience a reduction in the number of
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exporters (Ne, Ne*). After the initial shock to China’s productivity, the number of new entrant
firms continues to decrease, reversing the effect of the initial appreciation of labor in the United
States. Because enjoy less variety of consumption goods. As expected, the dollar depreciates at
first because of an increase in the prices of Chinese goods (decrease in supply). However, in the
long run the exchange rate appreciates as a result of US increasingly substituting away Chinese made
goods.
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Figure 3: Response to a Permanent Negative shock on China’s Productivity (Z)

Note: C is consumption in the United States. C* is consumption in China. Ne is the number of entry firms
in the United States. Ne* is the number of entry firms in China. Nd is the number of total firms in the
United States. Nd* is the number of total firms in China. Nx is the number of exporting firms in the
United States. Nx* is the number of exporting firms in China. Zx is the export cut off level in the United
States. Zx* is the export cut off level in the China. ToL is the effectiveness of the labor market in the
United States compared to China’s workers. QCPI is the exchange rate (dollars/Yean).
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Figure 4: Response to a Permanent Shock on both China and the United States’ iceberg cost of
trade (τ, τ*) on both economies

Note: C is consumption in the United States. C* is consumption in China. Ne is the number of entry firms
in the United States. Ne* is the number of entry firms in China. Nd is the number of total firms in the
United States. Nd* is the number of total firms in China. Nx is the number of exporting firms in the
United States. Nx* is the number of exporting firms in China. Zx is the export cut off level in the United
States. Zx* is the export cut off level in the China. ToL is the effectiveness of the labor market in the
United States compared to China and also an approximation of the exchange rate. QCPI is the exchange
rate (dollars/Yean). Export is U.S. exports. Imports is U.S. Imports.
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Figure II looks at the effect of a subsidy on US exports while simultaneously imposing a
tariff on its imports. First, a tariff on Chinese goods causes Chinese prices to decline in order to
compete with American products. Less firms will enter China’s market (Ne*), which
permanently reduces the number of overall firms (Nd*). On the contrary, U.S. prices will
increase causing the dollar to appreciate. Most of the appreciation of the U.S. dollar is driven by
a reduction of Chinese prices and an increase in the prices of American goods, causing the
exchange rate to decrease.30 This results in a permanent depreciation of China’s labor that leads
to a decrease in the home export cutoff, allowing a larger number of Chinese firms to export. The
dollar appreciation decrease in the number of exporting firms in the United States and a
corresponding increase in the number of exporting firms in China. The opposite happens in the
United States so that American firms need to be more productive than they were before the shock
in order to able to export. As a result, American consumers are worse off since there is less
variety (due to comparative advantage). Because of this new trade policy, both total imports and
exports in the United States decrease by approximately 8 percent (please note that if the
permanent trade shocks were to be smaller, the decrease in imports and exports would have been
lower as well).
4. Conclusions
This paper uses a stochastic general equilibrium model previously introduced by Ghironi
& Melitz (2005) to investigate a relevant international issue and an upcoming United States’
trade policy (namely, China economic slowdown and the United States’ proposed Border
Adjustment Tax).
In the first case, China is strongly affected by a permanent shock on its productivity.
∗
Please note that the real exchange rate is calculated as the following:
=
/ . Here is the nominal
∗
exchange rate,
is the price of Chinese goods at time t, and is the price of U.S. goods at time t.

30
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American firms enter into the United States market to offset the reduction in exports of Chinese
products, which decreases consumption (resources are not efficiently allocated). American
consumers are worst off as the variety of goods available decreases.
In the second case, a tariff on imports and a subsidy on exports leave consumers in the
United Sates (China) slightly worst (better) off after the trade policy is implemented. The labor
market in China is damaged by this new trade policy. Simultaneously, fewer firms enter the
Chinese market, which leads to an increase in consumer prices in the United States.
To conclude, a reduction in China’s productivity has a positive effect on American firms
and labor while it has a negative effect on exports and consumption. Overall investors and policy
makers should not fear a possible contraction in China’s economic growth. Finally, a Border
Adjustment Tax of 20 percent increase the U.S. dollar of approximately 20 percent (relative to
the world basket of currencies) which would fully offset the tax paid by importers and the
subsidy received by exporters. This policy is fully worthy of consideration, but also suffers from
several implementation risks (such as higher prices of goods for American consumers and less
verity).
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Conclusions
In the first chapter I conclude that the resulting CIT-rate differentials among
countries is leading to BEPS as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate
countries to affiliates located in low CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities
thus increasing their worldwide after-tax profits. This chapter seeks to gauge the effect of CITrate differentials among countries on BEPS. I improve upon the existing literature by accounting
for whether countries actually enforce their transfer-pricing rules and when they have the
incentive to do so because of the tax incentive facing domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong
evidence that correctly specifying the model of reported profits in the manner prescribed in this
paper has important implications for the correct choice of function form and a substantial effect
on the estimated semi-elasticities of reported profits. The main results are the following: the
estimated semi-elasticity of BEPS is equal to -3.5, meaning that a 10% increase in the tax rate
differential between countries results in a 35% decrease in reported earnings in the high tax
country; when there is an increase in the incentive for outbound profit shifting, firms that are
located in countries with strict anti-avoidance rules report 32% more profits than otherwise;
when there is an increase in the incentive for inbound profit shifting, firms with ultimate owners
located in countries with strict anti-avoidance rules report 10% less profits than otherwise. I also
conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy analysis. I use my
preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an estimate of this semielasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the policy simulation. This
exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a correctly specified model (that
takes into account enforcement) has a substantial effect on the estimated tax revenue effect of the
proposed reform. Future reaserch should apply the same methodology used in this paper for
developing coutries for which very little has been done.
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In the second chapter of my dissertation, I compute a principle component analysis using
federal funds futures and the LIBOR to capture short and long-run financial markets’ monetary
policy expectations in the United States. Differently from the current literature I use data on
federal funds futures and eurodollar futures collected not only on days of FOMC meeting but
also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are announced (namely change in non-farm
payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of Michigan
consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales). These macroeconomic indicators
are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which identify investors most followed
announcements on Bloomberg. After computing an event study I make three important
contributions to the current literature: first, monetary policy expectations are affected by
unexpected values of non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence
index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sale;
second, interest rates are expected to rise (fall) as a consequence of positive (negative)
macroeconomic indicators and FOMC announcements; third, financial markets not only react to
changes of short- and long-term monetary policy expectations on days of FOMC meetings, but
also on days when other macroeconomic news are publically announced. As previously
discussed, these results suggest that investors adjust their monetary policy expectations based on
the state of the economy and that financial markets are vulnerable to surprises in macroeconomic
news as well as FOMC announcements. These results emphasize the importance of a transparent
and well thought communication between the Federal Reserve and financial investors in order to
promote stability and stimulate investments. Future reaserch should extend the methodology
used in this paper to minutes data on stock markets.
In the last chapter, I use a stochastic general equilibrium model previously introduced by
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Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to investigate a relevant international issue and an upcoming United
States’ trade policy (namely, China economic slowdown and the United States’ proposed Border
Adjustment Tax). In the first case, China is strongly affected by a permanent shock on its
productivity. American firms enter into the United States market to offset the reduction in
exports of Chinese products, which decreases consumption (resources are not efficiently
allocated). American consumers are worst off as the variety of goods available decreases. In the
second case, a tariff on imports and a subsidy on exports leave consumers in the United Sates
(China) slightly worst (better) off after the trade policy is implemented. The labor market in
China is damaged by this new trade policy. Simultaneously, fewer firms enter the Chinese
market, which leads to an increase in consumer prices in the United States. To conclude, a
reduction in China’s productivity has a positive effect on American firms and labor while it has a
negative effect on exports and consumption. Overall investors and policy makers should not fear
a possible contraction in China’s economic growth. Finally, a Border Adjustment Tax of 20
percent increase the U.S. dollar of approximately 20 percent (relative to the world basket of
currencies) which would fully offset the tax paid by importers and the subsidy received by
exporters. This policy is fully worthy of consideration, but also suffers from several
implementation risks (such as higher prices of goods for American consumers and less verity).
Future research should calibrate the DSGE model used in this paper to better represent China and
the United States economic relationship (in this paper I used the standard calibration).
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Appendix
Table 16: Model Summary
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Source: Ghironi &Melize (2005). For the explanation of the parameters please see the text or Ghironi
&Melize (2005)’s paper.
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Table 17: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic indicators announcements
Days

S&P500

VIX

Path

Target

Path

0.010***

-0.059*

-1.328***

0.019***

0.018

GDP

0.009

ISM
CPI

One-year

Ten-years

Treasury Note

Treasury Bill

Treasury Bond

Path

Target

Path

Target

Path

Target

2.852

0.052***

0.726***

0.169***

0.619***

0.284***

-0.278***

-2.102***

-6.327

0.059***

0.882***

0.193***

0.703***

0.336***

-0.076

-0.097*

-1.500

17.077*

0.014

0.686**

0.141***

0.531***

0.350***

-0.334**

0.036***

0.013

-4.537***

-1.570

0.072***

0.122***

0.198***

0.141***

0.349***

0.241***

0.007

-0.047

-1.813*

5.824***

0.041

0.988**

0.152***

0.659**

0.336***

-.164*

C.C.I. **

0.035***

-0.055

-5.030***

13.384

0.050***

0.241

0.155***

0.512***

0.370***

-0.334***

U. Michigan Consumer

0.018***

0.026

-1.831*

-8.499*

0.060**

0.374

0.200***

0.410**

0.350***

0.012

Retails Sales

0.019*

0.102

-1.954*

-16.520*

0.056***

1.133***

0.161***

0.881***

0.332***

-1.000***

New Home Sales

0.013

0.019

-1.784*

1.146

0.100***

0.162

0.172***

1.092***

0.349***

-0.418*

0.018**

-0.011

-2.202*

-3.962

-0.014

0.680***

0.166***

0.531***

0.333***

-0.103**

Change In Non-Farm

Target

Three-months

Payroll
Initial Job Claims

Sentiment Index

FOMC

Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis (HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed in
percentage for the S&P500 and VIX and in basis points for treasury bill and notes. The path factor represents long-term monetary policy
expectations; the target factor represents short-term monetary policy expectations. ** Consumer Confidence Index
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Table 18: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic news announcements during the
latest global financial crisis
Days

S&P500

Path

Target

VIX

Path

Target

Three-months

One-year

Ten-years

Treasury Note

Treasury Bill

Treasury Bond

Path

Target

Path

Target

Path

Target

0.016*

-0.023

-1.599**

6.613

0.037***

0.504

0.112***

0.217

0.272***

-0.218

Initial Job Claims

0.023*

0.088

-2.443**

-12.687

0.040**

0.916

0.157***

0.699***

0.352***

-0.295

GDP

0.010

-0.148**

-0.683

27.263**

-0.014

0.459

0.081***

0.475***

0.398***

-0.337**

ISM

0.071***

0.013

-6.476***

2.301

0.028

0.123

0.136***

0.116*

0.418***

0.301***

CPI

0.023

-0.239**

-2.901*

25.000**

-0.015

0.122

0.096***

0.260

0.399***

-0.537**

C.C.I. **

0.054***

-0.174

-7.99***

26.809

0.018

-0.007

0.112***

0.501***

0.416***

-0.710***

U. Michigan Consumer

0.036***

0.091

-3.692**

-35.932***

0.005

0.875*

0.156***

1.047

0.366***

-0.426**

Retails Sales

0.026*

0.053

-3.554

-8.953*

0.051

1.111*

0.162***

0.865**

0.314***

-2.510***

New Home Sales

0.002

-0.130

-1.262

7.729

0.033

-0.142

0.109***

0.500

0.375***

-1.200*

0.029**

0.032

-3.202

-13.418***

.033

0.651***

0.132***

0.668***

0.362***

-0.258*

Change In Non-Farm
Payroll

Sentiment Index

FOMC

Note: Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis (HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed
in percentage for the S&P500 and VIX and in basis points for treasury bill and notes. The path factor represents long-term monetary policy
expectations; the target factor represents short-term monetary policy expectations. The event window is from December 2007 to June 2010.
** Consumer Confidence Index.
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